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Economic sanctions comprise six different types of legally-
required transfers of money or other value from an offender to 
a crime victim or a governmental agency.
1
 They are often one of 
several conditions of a criminal sentence,
2
 and over the past 
twenty-five years they have become more frequently imposed—
twenty-five percent of prisoners received economic sanctions in 
1991, but by 2004 the percentage was sixty-six percent.
3
 This 
trend toward increasing the use of economic sanctions is likely 
to continue, primarily because the costs of administering crimi-
nal justice have risen substantially. In major part, costs are 
high because there are so many people under correctional su-
pervision, almost seven million at yearend 2012.
4
 Corrections 
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 1. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 A–D (Tentative Draft 
No. 3, Apr. 24, 2014).  
 2. See Sally T. Hillsman, Fines and Day Fines, in 12 CRIME AND JUSTICE: 
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 49, 61 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1990). 
Typically, economic sanctions in the United States are additional penalties, 
rather than sole sanctions. Id. at 49. 
 3. Alexes Harris, Heather Evans & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood 
from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United 
States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1769 (2010). 
 4. At yearend 2012, there were about 6.94 million offenders under adult 
correctional supervision in the United States: 3.94 million on probation (the 
most common criminal sentence), 1.48 million in prison, 0.74 million in jail, 
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alone account for about seven percent of state budgets.
5
 Be-
cause of these rising costs and the absence of increasing reve-
nues to cover them, jurisdictions are now more likely to make 
offenders pay for at least part of these costs, including the costs 
of supervision and incarceration.
6
  
Related to the high use of incarceration is the increasing 
need for intermediate sanctions that are more severe than mere 
probation but less severe, and less expensive, than imprison-
ment.
7
 Because probation accounts for about fifty-seven percent 
of individuals under correctional supervision,
8
 the need for ef-
fective intermediate sanctions affects millions of offenders. 
In addition to these concerns about offenders and the costs 
to society, there are also concerns about crime victims, particu-
larly about increasing the likelihood that victims will receive 
restitution for their losses from the crime.
9
 Every state now has 
a statute authorizing restitution, and twenty states have ele-
vated restitution to a constitutional right.
10
  
However, simply because these economic sanctions are im-
posed does not mean that they are collected. And, in fact, 
enormous amounts of the monies that are owed are unpaid. In 
 
and 0.85 million on parole. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 3 (2013), available at http:// 
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus12.pdf. 
 5. CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE FISCAL 
CRISIS IN CORRECTIONS: RETHINKING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 3 (2009), 
available at http://www.vera.org/files/The-fiscal-crisis-in-corrections_July-2009 
.pdf. 
 6. See David E. Olson & Gerard F. Ramker, Crime Does Not Pay, But 
Criminals May: Factors Influencing the Imposition and Collection of Probation 
Fees, 22 JUSTICE SYS. J. 29, 30 (2001); Fox Butterfield, Many Local Officials 
Now Make Inmates Pay Their Own Way, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at A1, 
A17. 
 7. See Michael Tonry & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, in 20 
CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99, 100 (Michael Tonry ed., 
1996). 
 8. See GLAZE & HERBERMAN, supra note 4. 
 9. See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEW 
DIRECTIONS FROM THE FIELD: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS AND SERVICES FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 357 (1998) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS], available at https://www 
.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/directions/pdftxt/direct.pdf; R. Barry Ruback, Gretchen 
R. Ruth & Jennifer N. Shaffer, Assessing the Impact of Statutory Change: A 
Statewide Multilevel Analysis of Restitution Orders in Pennsylvania, 51 CRIME 
& DELINQ. 318, 319 (2005); R. Barry Ruback & Jennifer N. Shaffer, The Role 
of Victim-Related Factors in Victim Restitution: A Multi-Method Analysis of 
Restitution in Pennsylvania, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 657, 658 (2005). 
 10. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 356; PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY, 
MARIO T. GABOURY, ARRICK L. JACKSON & ASHLEY G. BLACKBURN, CRIME 
VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 157 (2d ed. 2010). 
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the federal system, for example, the Justice Department is 
seeking to recover ninety-seven billion dollars in fines, fees, and 
restitution.
11
  
The primary criticism of monetary sanctions is that they 
“are inherently inequitable,”
12
 in that they are unfair to many 
offenders who have little or no money but who face charges of 
hundreds or thousands of dollars, which they are unlikely to 
ever be able to pay. Aside from affecting their time under crim-
inal justice supervision, these economic sanctions may adverse-
ly affect their ability to obtain employment, credit, and hous-
ing.
13
 Moreover, in addition to having to deal with criminal 
charges, the mere fact that most offenders are poor is likely to 
adversely affect all of their important decisions because scarci-
ty places extra cognitive demands that make rational decision 
making more difficult.
14
 
This Article consists of six parts. Part I addresses the ques-
tion of whether economic sanctions are needed as a sentencing 
option. Part II describes and differentiates the primary types of 
economic sanctions, which are sometimes simply lumped to-
gether as “fines,”
15
 and considers these economic sanctions 
along dimensions of time (past orientation vs. future orienta-
tion) and target (offender vs. victim vs. society). 
In Part III, I discuss practical problems of economic sanc-
tions, the most important of which is determining an offender’s 
ability to pay. Other practical problems include determining 
economic sanctions when there are multiple types of sanctions, 
multiple victims, and multiple crimes and when offenders have 
few resources to make payments 
In Part IV, I argue that rules regarding economic sanctions 
must depend on the type of economic sanction involved. Resti-
tution to victims is the most defensible economic sanction be-
cause it can provide the tangible compensation and psychologi-
cal equity that are preconditions for restorative justice. 
Restoring equity can be of benefit to victims, to offenders, and 
to society. Fines are not as defensible as restitution, but are 
more defensible than costs and fees, because they have poten-
 
 11. Michael Rothfeld & Brad Reagan, Billions Going Unrecovered: Justice 
Department Doesn’t Expect To See Majority of $97 Billion Criminals Owe, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2014, at C1. 
 12. Tamara Walsh, Juvenile Economic Sanctions: A Logical Alternative?, 
13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 69, 71 (2014). 
 13. See Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1756. 
 14. See SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY 
HAVING TOO LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH (2013). 
 15. See Walsh, supra note 12, at 69. 
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tial value as intermediate sanctions in lieu of incarceration. 
Moreover, fines can be more directly tailored to the individual 
offender’s behavior and circumstances. Costs and fees are the 
least defensible sanction, and I argue that they should be pro-
hibited. 
In Part IV, recognizing that the elimination of costs and 
fees is highly unlikely, I recommend three more realistic 
changes regarding restitution: (1) the number of costs and fees 
should be reduced, especially at the county level; (2) sanction 
amounts should be realistic; and (3) making payments should 
be easier. Finally, in Part VII, I mention two issues, guidelines 
and research on state variation that need to be addressed in 
the future. 
I.  THE NEED FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS   
The foundational question is whether there should even be 
economic sanctions. Economic sanctions have four advantages 
over both traditional probation and incarceration in jail or pris-
on. First, economic sanctions use a metric that is understood by 
everyone, and especially by the legal system. The notion of us-
ing money as a means of resolving criminal problems goes back 
at least a thousand years.
16
 In the Middle Ages, victims were 
entitled to compensation for injuries (adjusted for their rank in 
society), and by the twelfth century, the king was entitled to a 
fee for administering the system.
17
 In contemporary America, 
the tort system involves money compensation for injuries. And, 
in the case of large numbers of victims caused by terrorism
18
 
and corporate malfeasance,
19
 the legal system uses money to 
cover the harms suffered. 
Second, economic sanctions provide flexibility in that they 
can be adjusted to an offender’s specific circumstances, alt-
hough they often are not.
20
 Paying economic sanctions is a pun-
 
 16. The idea of restitution goes back almost four thousand years to the 
Code of Hammurabi. Daniel W. Van Ness, Restorative Justice, in CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION 7 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson 
eds., 1990). 
 17. See ANDREW R. KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, INTERMEDIATE 
SANCTIONS AND PROBATION 153–54 (2d ed. 1997). 
 18. See, e.g., KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE 
UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 37 (2005). 
 19. See, e.g., Jeff Bennett, Kenneth Feinberg on GM Payouts: ‘Fast Is Pos-
sible, Fair Isn’t,’ WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (July 1, 2014, 3:47 PM), http://blogs 
.wsj.com/law/2014/07/01/kenneth-feinberg-on-gm-payouts-fast-is-possible-fair 
-isnt. 
 20. See SALLY T. HILLSMAN, BARRY MAHONEY, GEORGE F. COLE & 
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ishment for most offenders, especially the poor.
21
 For wealthy 
offenders, the amounts could be increased, so that the adjusted 
punishment is approximately equivalent to what is experienced 
by those with fewer assets. 
Third, economic sanctions can be used to serve different 
purposes, including helping the victim, restoring justice to soci-
ety, and punishing the offender.
22
 
Fourth, economic sanctions can be used to provide inter-
mediate punishments. At the low end of punishment is tradi-
tional probation, which typically includes a number of condi-
tions, such as reporting regularly to a probation officer, not 
leaving the county without permission, and not meeting with 
convicted felons.
23
 These conditions, which can number as many 
as twenty-five, are often not enforced, as probation officers may 
have caseloads over a hundred and may lack the time to ade-
quately supervise offenders.
24
 In addition, because probationers 
often move, probation officers may not supervise the offenders, 
even if they had the time and resources, because they may not 
even know where probationers are.
25
 Thus, probation alone is 
generally not very punitive. 
At the other, more punitive, extreme, is incarceration in 
prison, and for less serious crimes, incarceration in jail. Cur-
rently, there are 6.94 million individuals under correctional su-
pervision, approximately 1.5 million of whom are in prison.
26
 
Incarceration in prison is expensive and has major effects on 
inmates’ social and physical lives, both in prison and subse-
quently after release.
27
 And, although there may be some effect 
of incarceration on reducing recidivism, the results are clear 
that, beyond some point, there is no added deterrence benefit of 
additional time in prison.
28
 Prison is disruptive of family life 
 
BERNARD AUCHTER, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, FINES AS CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 4 
(1987) [hereinafter HILLSMAN ET AL., FINES AS SANCTIONS], available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/106773NCJRS.pdf. 
 21. See id. at 5. 
 22. DANIEL MCGILLIS, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CRIME VICTIM 
RESTITUTION: AN ANALYSIS OF APPROACHES 5, 11 (1986). 
 23. See Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, in 22 CRIME AND 
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 149, 164 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997). 
 24. See id. at 150. 
 25. See id. at 169. 
 26. See GLAZE & HERBERMAN, supra note 4. 
 27. See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA  
112–14 (2006). 
 28. See, e.g., PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, A STUDY ON THE USE AND 
IMPACT OF MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2009), available at http://www.conversations.psu.edu/ 
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and social networks, makes employment more difficult, and 
may reduce inmates’ long-term health.
29
 Incarceration is highly 
punitive and, particularly for those serving long sentences, may 
be counterproductive. 
Because of dissatisfaction with the lack of supervision of 
probation and the harsh punitiveness of incarceration, there 
have been numerous calls for intermediate sanctions, which 
would give judges and probation officers additional tools to help 
offenders learn skills, gain employment, deal with substance 
abuse problems, and address social and behavioral problems. 
Despite these advantages, it is important to recognize that 
economic sanctions also have disadvantages. First, economic 
sanctions automatically invoke factors associated with wealth 
and poverty, including race, class, education, job skills, and 
employment.
30
 There is also the issue that convicted offenders, 
especially those who have been incarcerated, face structural 
impediments and interpersonal biases that make reintegration 
difficult.
31
 Second, as discussed later, offenders’ inability to pay 
limits the usefulness of economic sanctions. Third, the focus on-
ly on economic sanctions is too limiting, as incentives can be 
economic, social, or moral.
32
 The focus on purely economic in-
centives ignores the fact that human behavior is also affected 
by people’s desire to be seen by others in a positive light and to 
be treated and to treat others fairly.
33
 By focusing only on eco-
nomic incentives, economic sanctions can undermine social and 
moral sanctions.
34
  
 
docs/SpecRptHR12of2007ExecSum.pdf. 
 29. See Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The Long-
Term Effects of Incarceration on Health, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115, 
121–23 (2007). 
 30. See generally SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: CLASS, RACE, AND GENDER IN 
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 2–4 (David B. Grusky ed., 3d ed. 2008) (discuss-
ing the “contours of inequality and exploring its causes”). 
 31. See Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and 
Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 528 (2002). 
 32. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE 
ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 17 (rev. & expanded 
ed. 2006). 
 33. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL 
MOTIVATIONS 17, 38–40 (2011). 
 34. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 1 (2000). In the study by Gneezy and Rustichini, the introduction of a 
small fine for parents who were late in picking up their children at a day care 
center increased the number of late pickups. Id. at 5–7. The authors interpret-
ed their findings as indicating that parents were willing to pay the fine be-
cause the social opprobrium originally associated with late pickups had pre-
sumably been removed with the introduction of the fine. Id. at 13–14.  
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II.  TYPES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS   
Depending on the jurisdiction, economic sanctions are 
sometimes referred to as monetary sanctions,
35
 financial obliga-
tions,
36
 or legal financial obligations.
37
 The revised Model Penal 
Code includes provisions for six types of economic sanctions: (1) 
restitution, (2) fines, (3) costs, (4) fees, (5) assessments, and (6) 
asset forfeiture.
38
  
As Ruback and Bergstrom argued, criminal sentencing in-
volves two time perspectives (looking to the past and looking to 
the future) and three parties (the victim, the offender, and soci-
ety).
39
 Looking to the past involves factors about the crime (the 
type, seriousness, harm caused, and offender’s culpability),
40
 
 
 35. See ROBERT W. TOBIN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FUNDING THE 
STATE COURTS: ISSUES AND APPROACHES 50 (1996), available at http:// 
cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/financial/id/5. 
 36. See ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 1 (2010), 
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees% 
20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf; Kirsten D. Levingston & Vicki Turetsky, 
Debtors’ Prison–Prisoners’ Accumulation of Debt As a Barrier to Reentry, 41 J. 
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 187, 187 (2007). 
 37. See ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ 
PRISONS 5 (2010), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_ 
web.pdf. 
 38. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 A–D (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
Apr. 24, 2014). The Model Penal Code addresses asset forfeiture in § 6.04 C 
(Tentative Draft No. 3, Apr. 24, 2014). Forfeiture, which can be either criminal 
or civil, refers to the government seizure of property that is illegal contraband, 
was illegally obtained, was acquired with resources that were illegally ob-
tained, or was used in an illegal activity. Asset forfeiture can constitute seri-
ous punishment and “all criminal justice systems seek to confiscate the pro-
ceeds of crime or otherwise order the forfeiture of property connected with its 
commission.” David Miers, Offender and State Compensation for Victims of 
Crime: Two Decades of Development and Change, 20 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 
145, 154 (2014). Criminal justice forfeitures have recently come under severe 
criticism for violation of the law. See, e.g., Michael Sallah, Robert O’Harrow, 
Jr. & Steven Rich, Stop and Seize: Aggressive Police Take Hundreds of Mil-
lions of Dollars from Motorists Not Charged with Crimes, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 
2014),http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and 
-seize; What’s Yours Is Theirs: A Homeowner Challenges Philadelphia’s Abu-
sive Civil Forfeiture Law, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www 
.wsj.com/articles/whats-yours-is-theirs-1409702898. I do not consider the issue 
here because there is so little social science evidence on point and because it is 
relevant to only certain kinds of crime (generally drug violations). Moreover, 
the alleged abuses associated with forfeiture often involve individuals who 
were not charged with, much less convicted of, criminal behavior. Sallah, 
O’Harrow & Rich, supra.  
 39. R. Barry Ruback & Mark H. Bergstrom, Economic Sanctions in Crim-
inal Justice: Purposes, Effects, and Implications, 33 CRIM. JUSTICE & BEHAV. 
242, 245 (2006). 
 40. See 1 PANEL ON SENTENCING RESEARCH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
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which are relevant to issues of blame, just deserts, and the res-
toration of equity.
41
 Blame and just deserts relate primarily to 
the offender, whereas considerations of equity relate to restor-
ing the victim and society to the condition they were in before 
the crime was committed. 
Future-oriented sentencing is concerned with the likeli-
hood that the offender will offend at some point, and thus judg-
es are concerned with reducing crime through deterrence and 
rehabilitation. Deterrence-oriented sentences are effective if 
they involve a high penalty because a rational offender would 
believe that the benefits of any future crime would be less than 
the costs he or she would suffer if caught and punished. Reha-
bilitation-oriented sentences are effective if they induce the of-
fender to believe that crime is wrong.  
The relevance of these sanctions depends on the intended 
target. For the crime victim, restitution is the only relevant 
economic sanction. It is past-oriented, aimed at restoring the 
victim, with little or no consideration of punishing the offender. 
For the offender, fines and forfeitures are past-oriented eco-
nomic sanctions, designed to punish the offender for prior be-
havior (with little or no consideration of reparation to a victim), 
and fees are future-oriented in the sense that they pay for ongo-
ing supervision (e.g., probation) and monitoring (e.g., drug 
tests). For society, past-oriented economic sanctions are aimed 
at making the offender pay for the costs of prosecuting the of-
fender and future-oriented sanctions are aimed at helping soci-
ety deal with future problems (e.g., future victims through 
payments to the state’s victim compensation fund) and helping 
to pay for continuing supervision.
42
 
Beyond their primary goals, these sanctions also have sec-
ondary purposes. Restitution can help with offender rehabilita-
tion. Fines, forfeitures, and fees can serve to deter as well as to 
punish. Costs can serve to punish as well as to restore equity 
with society. Restitution, fines, and costs and fees are ad-
dressed in greater detail below. 
A. RESTITUTION 
Restitution refers to a court-ordered payment by the of-
fender to compensate the victim for tangible financial losses di-
 
RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 9 (Alfred Blumstein, 
Jacqueline Cohen, Susan E. Martin & Michael H. Tonry eds., 1983). 
 41. See Philip Brickman, Crime and Punishment in Sports and Society, 33 
J. SOC. ISSUES 140, 151–55 (1977). 
 42. See Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 39, at 248–49. 
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rectly related to the crime.
43
 In contrast to pure punishment, 
which to be effective at deterrence must be greater than the 
harm caused,
44
 restitution is “exactly proportionate to the harm 
caused by the offense.”
45
  
1. Rationale for Restitution 
Going back to the Code of Hammurabi,
46
 Biblical law,
47
 and 
the Middle Ages,
48
 victims’ injuries were to be compensated by 
specified amounts of money. Although victims were entitled to 
receive compensation in colonial America,
49
 by the early nine-
teenth century, and for more than one hundred years, the con-
cerns of victims were largely ignored.
50
 Following passage of the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act in 1982, restitution was es-
tablished at the federal level, and in 1996 became mandatory in 
almost all federal cases as a result of the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act.
51
 All states have statutory provisions that per-
mit restitution,
52
 the justification for these laws being their re-
storative effects on victims or their rehabilitative effects on of-
fenders.
53
  
Nationally, restitution is imposed on 18% of convicted fel-
ons.
54
 More specifically, other studies suggest that restitution 
was ordered in 29% of the cases of felony probationers in 32 
counties
55
 and in 63% of restitution-eligible cases in Pennsylva-
 
 43. Id. at 249. It is particularly important that victims receive restitution 
as quickly as possible. See, e.g., KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: 
FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL 43 (2012). 
 44. See Brickman, supra note 41. 
 45. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RESTITUTION IN FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CASES 4 (2007). 
 46. See Van Ness, supra note 16.  
 47. “If anyone sins and commits a breach of faith . . . through robbery, . . . 
[he shall] restore what he took by robbery . . . he shall restore it in full and 
shall add a fifth to it, and give it to him to whom it belongs.” Leviticus 6:1–5.  
 48. KLEIN, supra note 17. 
 49. Id. at 154. 
 50. See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 10, at 153. 
 51. Matthew Dickman, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1688 
(2009). 
 52. See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 10, at 157. 
 53. See KLEIN, supra note 17, at 156–57.  
 54. MATTHEW DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT 
SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS, at 2004 tbl.1.9 (2007), available at http:// 
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04109tab.cfm. 
 55. MARK A. CUNNIFF & MARY K. SHILTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, VARIATIONS ON FELONY PROBATION: PERSONS UNDER 
SUPERVISION IN 32 URBAN AND SUBURBAN COUNTIES 34 (1991), available at 
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nia.
56
 Typically, restitution is handled by victim-focused agen-
cies affiliated with the district attorney’s office (e.g., Vic-
tim/Witness Assistance Programs) or by offender-focused agen-
cies (e.g., probation/parole supervision).
57
 Generally, victims 
and victim advocates have viewed restitution programs as un-
successful because: (a) judges are often reluctant to impose res-
titution on offenders who, they assume, cannot pay it; (b) even 
if restitution is imposed, the payment of restitution follows the 
payment of other court-ordered obligations (e.g., costs and 
fines); and (c) offenders often do not make restitution payments 
because it is not clear who is responsible for monitoring, collect-
ing, disbursing, and enforcing restitution payments.
58
 
Although restitution is now victim-oriented, historically, it 
was an offender-focused remedy
59
 that was intended to promote 
the offender’s rehabilitation rather than to compensate the vic-
tim.
60
 Imposing, monitoring, and enforcing restitution orders is 
expensive, sometimes costing more money than is likely to be 
brought in. In the federal system, the cost of a single restitution 
order is $2,000.
61
 
I am discussing restitution first because it demonstrates 
the importance I think should be placed on victims. The crimi-
nal justice system is focused on offenders rather than victims.
62
 
By making restitution mandatory, my emphasis is on victims 
rather than offenders.
63
 The problems usually faced by offend-
ers are also faced by victims—they are disproportionately poor, 
unemployed, unskilled, and racial/ethnic minorities. Victims 
suffer both direct costs, such as lost or damaged property, med-
ical expenses, lost wages, mental health counseling, and 
drug/alcohol treatment, and indirect costs, such as purchasing 
protection devices, paying increased insurance costs, moving, 
 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/131580NCJRS.pdf. 
 56. Ruback & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 659. 
 57. See Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 39, at 250.  
 58. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 358. 
 59. Dickman, supra note 51, at 1702. 
 60. See id. at 1702–03 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court decisions that ad-
dress justifications for restitution). 
 61. Id. at 1708.  
 62. See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT, 
VICTIMS OF CRIME IN AMERICA, at ii (1982), available at http://www.ovc.gov/ 
publications/presdntstskforcrprt/87299.pdf. 
 63. Professor Bruce Benson takes this emphasis on victims’ rights to resti-
tution to an extreme, arguing that the criminal justice system should be pri-
vatized so that the emphasis is on victim restitution rather than offender pun-
ishment. Bruce L. Benson, Decriminalisation, Restitution and Privatisation: 
The Path to Reduced Violence and Theft, 21 GRIFFITH L. REV. 448 (2012). 
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and avoiding certain neighborhoods.
64
 Tangible losses can cause 
direct tangible harms (e.g., a stolen car), indirect tangible 
harms (e.g., losing a job because of a lack of transportation), 
and intangible harms (e.g., stress from financial worries). Re-
ceiving restitution can address not only issues of tangible 
harms, but an order of restitution alone can also have some 
“placebo value” because it gives victims the impression that 
their concerns are being taken into account.
65
 The largest in-
tangible cost is generally pain and suffering,
66
 although there 
are also intangible costs relating to reduced quality of life and 
fear of crime. The most recent estimates of victims’ tangible 
and intangible losses are $19,000 for robbery with injury, 
$24,000 for an assault with injury, and $87,000 for rape.
67
 
In addition to the harms of physical injury (and the result-
ing medical and hospital charges), lost wages, and property 
damage and loss, victims often suffer from the same sort of 
credit, employment, and housing problems facing offenders, 
which is not surprising because many victims are, have been, 
or will be offenders.
68
 Victims also suffer increased chances of 
revictimization
69
 through links between drug and alcohol use, 
depression, and criminal offending.
70
 
 
 64. See DEAN G. KILPATRICK, DAVID BEATTY & SUSAN SMITH HOWLEY, 
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS—DOES LEGAL 
PROTECTION MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 8–9 (1998), available at http://www 
.cvactionalliance.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/ 
RightsofCrimeVictimslegalprotection.pdf. 
 65. See Anthony Walsh, Placebo Justice: Victim Recommendations and 
Offender Sentences in Sexual Assault Cases, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1126, 1139–41 (1986). 
 66. See, e.g., LYNN LANGTON & JENNIFER TRUMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SOCIO-EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF VIOLENT CRIME 1 (2013), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sivc.pdf (noting that about sixty-eight per-
cent of victims of serious violent crime experience socioemotional problems as 
a result of the crime); NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, MAKING 
RESTITUTION REAL: FIVE CASE STUDIES ON IMPROVING RESTITUTION 
COLLECTION 3–4 (2011) [hereinafter MAKING RESTITUTION REAL], available at 
http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/2011-Natl-Center-for-
Victims-of-Crime-report.pdf. 
 67. MARK A. COHEN, THE COSTS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 42–43 (2005). 
 68. Cf. Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Deviant Lifestyles, Prox-
imity to Crime, and the Offender-Victim Link in Personal Violence, 27 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 110, 113–14 (1990); JENNIFER N. SHAFFER & R. BARRY 
RUBACK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION AS A RISK FACTOR 
FOR VIOLENT OFFENDING AMONG JUVENILES 1–2 (2002), available at https:// 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/195737.pdf. 
 69. See Maureen Outlaw, Barry Ruback & Chester Britt, Repeat and Mul-
tiple Victimizations: The Role of Individual and Contextual Factors, 17 
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 187, 195–201 (2002). 
 70. R. Barry Ruback, Valerie A. Clark & Cody Warner, Why Are Crime 
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Restitution addresses the tangible needs of victims by re-
imbursing them for the tangible costs incurred from the crime, 
although restitution is not ordered in every case where it could 
be imposed
71
 and restitution orders generally do not cover the 
full costs of the harm suffered by victims.
72
 It legitimizes vic-
tims’ socioemotional needs by indicating, in an official and pub-
lic manner, that their victimization was wrong and should be 
repaired.
73
 Restitution may also address victims’ emotional 
needs by holding offenders responsible for, and forcing them to 
acknowledge, the harms they caused.
74
 Restitution cannot be 
ordered for pain and suffering,
75
 but it can cover medical bills, 
mental health counseling, replacement of lost or stolen proper-
ty, and funeral expenses.
76
  
Aside from addressing the needs of victims, many scholars 
and practitioners alike support restitution because it forces of-
fenders to confront the harms they caused victims, makes them 
responsible for correcting those harms, and gives them a sense 
of accomplishment when they have paid the restitution.
77
 Con-
sistent with that notion, there is some suggestion in research 
that victims prefer restitution from the offender over compen-
sation from the state because restitution means that the of-
fender must acknowledge the harm that was inflicted.
78
 If those 
goals are met, paying restitution is associated with lower rates 
 
Victims at Risk of Being Victimized Again? Substance Use, Depression, and 
Offending As Mediators of the Victimization-Revictimization Link, 29 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 157, 160–62 (2014). 
 71. As in the United States, restitution is generally not imposed in the 
United Kingdom, occurring in less than one-third of burglary cases and less 
than half of criminal damages cases. Miers, supra note 38, at 150. 
 72. Id. at 148. 
 73. Cf. MAKING RESTITUTION REAL, supra note 66, at 4. 
 74. See Tyler G. Okimoto & Tom R. Tyler, Is Compensation Enough? Rela-
tional Concerns in Responding to Unintended Inequity, 10 GROUP PROCESSES 
& INTERGROUP REL. 399, 401 (2007). 
 75. For damages that are more difficult to quantify, like pain and suffer-
ing, civil court options are available. See NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 
RESTITUTION (2004), available at http://www.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime 
-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/restitution. 
 76. See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 355.  
 77. MCGILLIS, supra note 22, at 13–19. 
 78. Miers, supra note 38, at 148 (citing Gordon Bazemore, Crime Victims, 
Restorative Justice and the Juvenile Court: Exploring Victim Needs and In-
volvement in the Response to Youth Crime, 6 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 295 
(1999); Daniela Bolivar, Conceptualizing Victims’ ‘Restoration’ in Restorative 
Justice, 17 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 237 (2010); Jonathan Doak & David 
O’Mahony, The Vengeful Victim? Assessing the Attitudes of Victims Participat-
ing in Restorative Youth Conferencing, 13 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 157 (2006). 
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of recidivism for both adult offenders
79
 and juvenile offenders.
80
 
Unfortunately, analyses of recidivism generally look only at 
gross categories of interventions (e.g., probation, intensive pro-
bation, jail, prison) rather than at specific types of sanctions, 
such as economic sanctions.
81
 There are only a few studies ex-
amining the relationship between the payment of restitution 
and recidivism, and their value is limited by relatively small 
sample sizes and potential problems of omitted variable bias 
and reverse causality.
82
 
Unaddressed by restitution, but illustrative of the fact that 
crime has many repercussions for victims, are the indirect 
harms to the community caused by the links between poverty 
and crime. Poor communities suffer broken windows that can-
not be repaired because of the expense, and there have been 
claims that broken windows lead to crime,
83
 although the re-
search is not definitive.
84
 Moreover, communities that have 
high rates of crime are those where people who are able to will 
move out, leaving only those who, because they are too poor, 
who cannot leave the community.
85
 High rates of mobility into 
 
 79. Joe Heinz, Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson, Restitution or Parole: A Fol-
low-Up Study of Adult Offenders, 50 SOC. SERV. REV. 148, 152–54 (1976); 
Maureen C. Outlaw & R. Barry Ruback, Predictors and Outcomes of Victim 
Restitution Orders, 16 JUSTICE Q. 847, 850–52 (1999).  
 80. David P. Farrington & Brandon C. Welsh, Randomized Experiments 
in Criminology: What Have We Learned in the Last Two Decades? 1 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 9, 29–30 (2005); Stacy Hoskins Haynes, Alison 
C. Cares & R. Barry Ruback, Juvenile Economic Sanctions: An Analysis of 
Their Imposition, Payment, and Effect on Recidivism, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 31, 51–52 (2014); Anne L. Schneider, Restitution and Recidivism Rates 
of Juvenile Offenders: Results from Four Experimental Studies, 24 
CRIMINOLOGY 533, 549–51 (1986). 
 81. Joshua C. Cochran, Daniel P. Mears & William D. Bales, Assessing the 
Effectiveness of Correctional Sanctions, 30 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 
317, 318 (2014). 
 82. See, e.g., Outlaw & Ruback, supra note 79, at 861–63. 
 83. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police 
and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 1982), http://www.theatlantic 
.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465. 
 84. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of 
the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, 
and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 308–
42 (1998); Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: 
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q., 319, 336–37 (2004). 
 85. See R. BARRY RUBACK & MARTIE P. THOMPSON, SOCIAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION 168–69 (2001); 
see also Laura Dugan, The Effect of Criminal Victimization on a Household's 
Moving Decision, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 903, 922–24 (1999) (noting an increase in a 
household’s probability of moving “after any of its members are victimized”). 
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and out of the community undermine community cohesion, and 
this social disorganization can lead to crime.
86
  
2. Current Status of Restitution in the States 
States differ in their support of victims’ rights regarding 
restitution. An examination of the laws concerning restitution 
for all fifty states and the District of Columbia, using the 
VictimLaw searchable database maintained by the Office for 
Victims of Crime,
87
 indicates that twenty states give victims a 
constitutional right to restitution.
88
 Thirty-three states make 
restitution mandatory (e.g., using “shall” rather than “may”), 
but three of those states (Connecticut, Idaho, and North Dako-
ta) introduce qualifications to mandatory restitution.
89
 Six 
states prohibit judges from considering the defendant’s ability 
to pay when imposing restitution, thus making restitution de-
pendent on the victim’s actual losses rather than on the de-
fendant’s present and future assets and wages—symbolically 
placing the victim’s interests above those of the defendant.
90
 
Twenty-three states explicitly indicate that judges can consider 
the defendant’s financial resources, in some cases stating that 
the judge must consider the impact of paying restitution on the 
defendant and the defendant’s dependents.
91
 Twenty-one states 
do not have a law that addresses the issue of whether the judge 
is to consider the defendant’s ability to pay, meaning that the 
judge can consider the defendant’s ability to pay.
92
  
Even among the states that have mandatory restitution 
statutes, there is inconsistency in that some states require res-
titution only for violent crimes whereas others require restitu-
 
 86. Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and 
Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory, 94 AM. J. SOC. 774, 799–800 
(1989). 
 87. Office of Justice Programs, VICTIMLAW, https://www.victimlaw.org/ 
victimlaw/start.do (follow “Search by topic”; select “Right to restitution”; select 
“Court authority to order restitution”; select “Federal” and “State and Territo-
ries”; select “States and regulatory provisions”; select “Select all”; then search 
for results). The laws listed in the database are current as of 2011. 
 88. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 10, at 157. VictimLaw gives the num-
ber as 18, but I agree with Tobolowsky and my own reading of the constitu-
tions of Montana and Virginia. See VICTIMLAW, supra note 87. 
 89. See VICTIMLAW, supra note 87; cf. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 10, 
at 157. 
 90. See VICTIMLAW, supra note 87; cf. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 10, 
at 157–58. 
 91. See VICTIMLAW, supra note 87. 
 92. See id. 
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tion only for property crimes.
93
 There are also differences 
among the states in terms of who can receive restitution. In 
some states, only the victim can receive restitution, but in other 
states, family members and victims’ estates, as well as agencies 
that provide assistance to victims (e.g., victim service agencies, 
compensation programs), can receive restitution.
94
 Further dif-
ferences among states arise in terms of whether indirect vic-
tims (e.g., insurance companies) and local governments are en-
titled to restitution.
95
 In some states, incarcerated offenders 
must pay restitution, whereas in others offenders must be on 
probation or parole.
96
 States also differ in terms of whether ju-
veniles are obligated to pay restitution.
97
 
Most defendants have few financial resources, meaning 
that it is unlikely victims will receive the restitution they are 
owed or that state and local governments will receive the fines, 
fees, and costs that were imposed.
98
 Eleven states require that 
restitution be paid before other economic sanctions, meaning 
that, if any payments are made, the victim, rather than the 
state or local government, will receive it.
99
 Fourteen states have 
laws that automatically convert restitution orders into civil 
judgments, and eight states have a law whereby a restitution 
order permits the seizure of assets or property or the attach-
ment of wages.
100
  
3. Imposition and Payment of Restitution 
The Office for Victims of Crime has recommended manda-
tory restitution.
101
 This requirement of mandatory restitution is 
easier to defend for some victims than others. In particular, 
some judges are reluctant to require restitution for businesses 
and especially insurance companies.
102
 The ABA Victims Com-
mittee also recommended that “[t]he offender’s ability to pay 
should not determine whether the offender will be sentenced to 
restitution,”
103
 although the court can consider ability to pay “in 
 
 93. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 356–57.  
 94. Id. at 357. 
 95. KLEIN, supra note 17, at 170. 
 96. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 357. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 39, at 243, 264. 
 99. See VICTIMLAW, supra note 87. 
 100. Id. 
 101. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9, at 364.  
 102. Ruback & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 664. 
 103. Victims Comm., Restitution for Crime Victims: A National Strategy, 
2004 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUSTICE 15. 
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fashioning the mode and schedule of payment.”
104
 Under federal 
law and the law of many states, however, the court must con-
sider the defendant’s financial resources.
105
  
Case factors and offender characteristics are the best pre-
dictors of whether restitution will be imposed.
106
 Beyond that, 
one of the strongest predictors of receiving an order of restitu-
tion is the ease with which damages can be quantified.
107
 Ra-
tionally, longer criminal records should be related to larger 
amounts of economic sanctions because offenders who have 
committed crimes despite having been punished before should 
be punished more and require more deterrence. However, there 
is evidence that offenders with longer criminal records are like-
ly to receive significantly lower economic sanctions, even con-
trolling for whether the offender was sentenced to a term of in-
carceration.
108
 It seems that judges believe offenders with 
longer records are less likely to pay any economic sanctions im-
posed, and therefore, judges simply do not impose them. The 
finding that individuals who were sentenced to prison were 
significantly less likely to have mandatory economic sanctions 
imposed is consistent with the finding of Harris et al., who used 
national data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and found 
that probationers and misdemeanants were more likely than 
prisoners to have economic sanctions imposed.
109
 
Typically, when an offender makes a payment (to the clerk 
of courts or the probation office), some money is forwarded to 
the victim, depending on legal and jurisdictional practical fac-
tors such as whether restitution is paid before other economic 
sanctions and how restitution is divided among multiple vic-
tims. For example, a study found that in one county in Penn-
sylvania, victims from older convictions were paid first, but in 
another county, payments were evenly divided across all vic-
 
 104. Id. at 17. 
 105. Id. at 16. 
 106. See Outlaw & Ruback, supra note 79, at 849–50; cf. R. Barry Ruback, 
Jennifer N. Shaffer & Melissa A. Logue, The Imposition and Effects of Restitu-
tion in Four Pennsylvania Counties: Effects of Size of County and Specialized 
Collection Units, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 168, 171–74 (2004). 
 107. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORDERING 
RESTITUTION TO THE CRIME VICTIM 5 (2002), available at https://www.ncjrs 
.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin6/ncj189189.pdf; Outlaw & 
Ruback, supra note 79, at 857; Ruback, Shaffer & Logue, supra note 106, at 
182. 
 108. See R. Barry Ruback & Valerie Clark, Economic Sanctions in Pennsyl-
vania: Complex and Inconsistent, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 751, 768–70 (2011). 
 109. Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1769–71. 
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tims, regardless of when the conviction occurred.
110
 The study 
also found that in most counties, individual victims were paid 
before business victims, state victims, or insurance compa-
nies.
111
 Although Pennsylvania law requires that the first fifty 
percent of all offender payments be applied to restitution and 
that other economic sanctions (e.g., fines, fees, costs) be paid af-
ter that, some counties required that one hundred percent of 
payments be applied to restitution until it is paid in full.
112
 At 
the other extreme, one county, counter to the law, required that 
supervision fees and DUI course instructors be paid before res-
titution.
113
 Aside from policy disagreements, judges might not 
 
 110. R. BARRY RUBACK, ALISON C. CARES & STACY N. HOSKINS, 
EVALUATION OF BEST PRACTICES IN RESTITUTION AND VICTIM COMPENSATION 
ORDERS AND PAYMENTS 119–20 (2006) [hereinafter RUBACK ET AL., 
EVALUATION], available at http://pcs.la.psu.edu/publications-and-research/ 
research-and-evaluation-reports/special-reports/act-37-of-2007-economic 
-sanctions/special-report-evaluation-of-best-practices-in-restitution-and-
victim-compensation-orders-and-payments/view.  
 111. With regard to the type of victim for which restitution is appropriate, 
judges’ responses were consistent with the statute, in that individuals and 
businesses were ranked higher than the Victim Compensation Board and in-
surance companies were ranked very low. See id. at 158, 170, 187. Indeed, 
some judges were not willing to order restitution for insurance companies. See 
id. at 153, 178. In general, however, the ranking of victims was consistent 
with the remarks of one judge who said,  
Although I order restitution in every case where it is claimed, I be-
lieve it is far more important that an individual, rather than a corpo-
rate entity, is made whole. Such losses are a part of doing business. 
For insurance companies, I do not see an insured getting a rebate be-
cause a defendant reimbursed the company. 
 R. BARRY RUBACK, RESTITUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA: A MULTIMETHOD 
INVESTIGATION 58 (2002) [hereinafter RUBACK, RESTITUTION IN 
PENNSYLVANIA]. “There was also an indication that judges found some system-
related enforcement difficulties to be problematic, although not as problematic 
as offender problems.” Ruback & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 664. Restitution also 
was not imposed at higher rates due to disagreements over the statute.  
  Although judges, prosecutors, and probation officers all agreed 
that the primary goal of restitution is victim compensation, they also 
said that it serves both to rehabilitate and punish the offender. Given 
that punishment is not supposed to be a goal of restitution but that 
decision makers believe that in fact it is, they may be inclined to 
avoid imposing restitution in order to avoid punishing the offender 
further. Consistent with this explanation for why restitution was not 
imposed in all situations where it might have been, one judge wrote 
the following on his survey: “Many judges give stiff sentences in lieu 
of restitution, less stiff sentences if restitution is ordered. This prac-
tice is incompatible to the given situation and dissatisfies the victims 
and breaks down the reasons for restitution and its effective collec-
tion.”  
RUBACK, RESTITUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra at 57. 
 112. RUBACK ET AL., EVALUATION, supra note 110, at 119. 
 113. See id. at 168–69. If the offender made a large payment, fifty percent 
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impose restitution in all cases because of practical limitations 
on the system’s ability to collect it. Or, as one judge from a 
large city put it: 
I hear only major crimes where 90+% of the time the offenders are in-
digent. You can’t get blood out of a stone. When you have rapes, ag-
gravated assaults, gun-point robberies [by] those with no skills [and] 
who have never held a job, what good is restitution? They will be in 
jail for five to ten years and have no assets. It’s the exception, not the 
rule, in the major cases in a large city.
114
  
For offenders who do not make restitution payments, 
courts can extend probation, revoke probation, hold them in 
contempt, and, if there is no showing of inability to pay, incar-
cerate.
115
 However, data suggests that judges only infrequently 
put offenders in jail for nonpayment of restitution and even 
more rarely when that nonpayment is the only violation of pro-
bation.
116
 
Studies repeatedly find that victims do not receive full res-
titution for their losses because it is not imposed; and if im-
posed, the imposed amounts either do not cover victims’ losses 
or, even if imposed in full, are not paid.
117
 In one study, only 
43% of victims said that the amount of restitution ordered cov-
ered their losses,
118
 and another study reported that only 18% of 
victims believed the court took their estimation of losses into 
account when setting the restitution amount.
119
 Vermont’s Res-
titution Unit has an overall collection rate of only 24%.
120
 A 
study of six Pennsylvania counties found that two to four years 
after conviction, the average percentage of restitution paid 
ranged from 34% to 74%,
121
 and a survey of victims in two of 
 
was applied to restitution; because DUI courses are expensive (i.e., $250 or 
more) and supervision fees are about $35 a month, large payments were un-
common. In non-DUI cases, the county was in compliance with the law. See 
generally id. app. F at 167–76. 
 114. RUBACK, RESTITUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 111, at 58. 
 115. Victims Comm., supra note 103, at 27–34. 
 116. R. Barry Ruback, The Abolition of Fines and Fees: Not Proven and Not 
Compelling, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 569, 574–75 (2011) [hereinafter 
Ruback, Abolition]. 
 117. Cf. Victims Comm., supra note 103, at 1–3. The Committee suggested 
that restitution payments could be increased if more aggressive tactics were 
adopted, “including income garnishments, property liens, intercepting income 
tax refunds, reporting debts to credit agencies, ‘booting’ cars, suspension of 
driving and other licenses and ‘most wanted’ lists.” Id. at 3. 
 118. Robert C. Davis, Barbara Smith & Susan Hillenbrand, Restitution: 
The Victim’s Viewpoint, 15 JUSTICE SYS. J. 746, 754 tbl. 1 (1992). 
 119. RUBACK ET AL., EVALUATION, supra note 110, at 213 tbl.K-1. 
 120. MAKING RESTITUTION REAL, supra note 66, at 42. 
 121. RUBACK ET AL., EVALUATION, supra note 110, at 45. 
2015] ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 1797 
 
those six counties found that only 24% had received full restitu-
tion, 28% had received partial restitution, and 48% had re-
ceived no restitution.
122
 Finally, even if the restitution is paid, 
victims are not likely to receive it when they most need it. One 
study found that only 37% of victims were satisfied with the 
timeliness of restitution.
123
 
Victims are generally not kept informed about the restitu-
tion process,
124
 and they generally do not understand the pro-
cess.
125
 Moreover, there is a real concern that “[f]or many vic-
tims restitution becomes a hollow promise” because it is 
unlikely to be paid.
126
 And, if victims are dissatisfied with the 
restitution process, they may experience it within a second vic-
timization and be less likely to cooperate with the criminal jus-
tice system in the future.
127
  
Rather than think of restitution as a penalty, it is possible 
to consider it as a restorative justice procedure. Restorative jus-
tice practices assume that the justice process is about repairing 
the harm from a crime in a way that balances the needs of the 
victim, the community, and the offender.
128
 Restorative justice 
includes both a formal process, administered by the govern-
ment and focused on accountability and reparation, and an in-
formal process, administered by the community, which treats 
the victim with respect and attempts to reintegrate the offend-
er into the community.
129
  
Research suggests that rates of restitution payment may 
be higher in restorative justice programs than traditional crim-
inal justice programs, although the research is limited by selec-
tion bias problems (e.g., only some subgroups of offenders and 
 
 122. R. Barry Ruback, Alison C. Cares & Stacy N. Hoskins, Crime Victims’ 
Perceptions of Restitution: The Importance of Payment and Understanding, 23 
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 697, 704 (2008) [hereinafter Ruback et al., Perceptions]. 
 123. Davis et al., supra note 118, at 752. 
 124. See id. at 752 (finding that only nineteen percent of victims in the 
study believed they were well-informed about restitution); see also Ruback et 
al., Perceptions, supra note 122, at 705 (making a similar finding regarding a 
lack of information). 
 125. Davis et al., supra note 118, at 705 (finding that on a seven-point scale 
of how well victims understood the restitution process, the mean was below 
the midpoint). 
 126. Id. at 746. 
 127. Ruback, et al., Perceptions, supra note 122, at 708. 
 128. Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, Rethinking the Sanctioning Func-
tion in Juvenile Court: Retributive or Restorative Responses to Youth Crime, 41 
CRIME & DELINQ. 296, 302 (1995); Van Ness, supra note 1646, at 9. 
 129. Van Ness, supra note 16, at 12. 
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victims can participate in the program).
130
 Victims may benefit 
from these programs because they receive informational sup-
port (i.e., they learn of the rights and services available to vic-
tims), emotional support (i.e., the harms they suffered are 
acknowledged, and they have an opportunity to be heard), and 
tangible support (i.e., restitution). Thus, from a victim’s per-
spective, restorative justice programs may be better than resti-
tution alone.
131
  
The Restitution in Pennsylvania Task Force made several 
suggestions about how to ensure that victims are awarded res-
titution and that offenders pay the amounts ordered.
132
 To 
make it easier for judges to understand the law and to issue 
restitution orders, the Task Force suggested that the state clar-
ify and standardize policies regarding the imposition of restitu-
tion.
133
 In addition, the Task Force suggested that there be the 
possibility of sanctions for nonpayment of restitution.
134
 The 
Task Force also recommended that victims be provided with 
more information about what restitution is and how it is im-
posed, collected, and distributed, and that, to make it easier to 
locate victims, a web-based system be established so that vic-
tims could update their contact information relating to the res-
titution order.
135
  
A recent experiment suggests that there can be cost-
effective ways for probation officers to induce offenders to pay 
the restitution they owe.
136
 The study suggests that informing 
 
 130. Jeff Latimer, Craig Dowden & Danielle Muise, The Effectiveness of 
Restorative Justice Practices: A Meta-Analysis, 85 PRISON J. 127, 137 (2005). 
 131. See generally Haynes et al., supra note 80. 
 132. PA. OFFICE OF THE VICTIM ADVOCATE, RESTITUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA 
TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, (Feb. 2013), http://www.center-school.org/ 
Restitution/pdf/Restitution_Taskforce_Full_Report.pdf. 
 133. Id. at 7–8. 
 134. The Task Force suggested such actions as suspending state driver’s 
licenses for offenders who do not pay, mandating Clerks of Court to file civil 
judgments when a case balance exceeds $1,000, increasing means to collect 
restitution by directly taking money from the offender (e.g., attaching wages 
and/or attaching IRS refunds), and inducing the offender to pay through 
threats to restrict travel, limit eligibility for public assistance, and file con-
tempt of court proceedings. Id. at 35. 
 135. Id. at 8–9. 
 136. R. Barry Ruback, Andrew Gladfelter & Brendan Lantz, Paying Resti-
tution: Experimental Analysis of the Effects of Information and Rationale, 13 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 405 (2014). In the experiment, “offenders were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 x 2 between-subjects design 
in which, over a six-month period, three-quarters of the offenders received 
monthly letters that contained (a) information or no information about the 
economic sanctions they had paid and what they still owed (Information ma-
nipulation) and (b) a statement or no statement about reasons for paying resti-
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offenders on a regular basis about how much restitution they 
have paid and how much they still owe can lead them to pay 
more restitution and to make more monthly payments—effects 
that were interpreted as being due primarily to a change in in-
ternal motivation—consistent with the rationale for restorative 
justice.
137
 Although the question of the generalizability of the 
procedure remains open, the results of this experiment suggest 
that, at relatively little cost (because information about pay-
ments was gathered from individuals’ court dockets publicly 
available on the web), governments can increase restitution 
payments, benefiting victims, society, and perhaps the offend-
ers themselves. 
B. FINES  
Fines are monetary penalties for crime. Nationally, they 
are imposed on thirty-three percent of convicted felons.
138
 Fines 
can be used as the sole sanction or in combination with other 
sanctions, from treatment to incarceration.
139
 In some jurisdic-
tions, fines are used as prosecution diversion devices, such that 
charges are dismissed when the fines are paid.
140
 Fines can also 
be targeted to support specific purposes. For example, most 
fines in the federal system are deposited in the Crime Victims 
Fund, ninety percent of which is sent to the states for victim 
compensation and assistance.
141
  
In contrast to the assumption of the Model Penal Code,
142
 
many scholars believe economic sanctions have strengths, that 
is, have some penological value. First, there is some evidence 
 
tution (Rationale manipulation). The remaining offenders did not receive a let-
ter.” Over a one-year period (the six months of letters and a six-month follow-
up period), “offenders who had received letters containing information . . . paid 
significantly more money and made significantly more monthly payments 
than did offenders in the other three experimental conditions. A cost-
effectiveness analysis indicated that for every dollar spent on the experi-
mental manipulation, about $6.44 in restitution was received.” Id. at 405. 
 137. Ruback, Gladfelter, and Lantz reasoned that “if it were fear of being 
monitored that led to the increased payments, then the absence of monitoring 
(i.e., no letters for six months) should have reduced that fear, meaning that 
payments should have been reduced[, and t]hey were not.” Id. at 406. 
 138. DUROSE, supra note 54. 
 139. Hillsman, supra note 2, at 61–62. 
 140. Tonry & Lynch, supra note 7, at 128 (discussing the use of fines as 
prosecution diversion devices in Europe). 
 141. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-99-70, FEDERAL COURTS: 
DIFFERENCES EXIST IN ORDERING FINES AND RESTITUTION 1 (1999). In Penn-
sylvania, fines are also used to support a Crime Victim Compensation Fund. 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11.1101(b)(1) (2014). 
 142. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE (2014). 
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that, compared with incarceration, fines are about as effective 
at deterring future crime
143
 but are substantially cheaper be-
cause the state does not have to pay for housing.
144
 Moreover, 
fines can avoid some of the stigma and secondary effects of in-
carceration, such as loss of employment and unsupported de-
pendents, who would otherwise have to rely on public assis-
tance.
145
 Second, compared with simple probation, fines are 
more punitive and thus can serve as intermediate sanctions be-
tween probation and prison.
146
 Third, fines can be flexible, in 
that they can be adjusted to the facts of the case and the cir-
cumstances of the offender.
147
 Moreover, they can be used alone, 
with incarceration, with probation, or with both incarceration 
and probation.
148
 Fourth, evaluating the success of fines is rela-
tively easy and straightforward, and is usually determined by 
an offender’s level of payment. 
Fines have been criticized for not being rehabilitative,
149
 
but the alternative—short periods of incarceration—is also non-
rehabilitative.
150
 Doing away with fines makes incarceration 
more likely since there would be fewer intermediate sanctions 
available.
151
 
In the United States, many people oppose the use of fines 
because they cannot be enforced against the poor
152
 and have 
little impact on the wealthy.
153
 Fines with absolute maximums 
 
 143. Margaret A. Gordon & Daniel Glaser, The Use and Effects of Financial 
Penalties in Municipal Courts, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 651, 672 (1991). 
 144. NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND 
PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING 
SYSTEM 157 (1990) (analyzing the costs of incarceration). 
 145. Gordon & Glaser, supra note 143, at 651–52. 
 146. See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. 
 147. HILLSMAN ET AL., FINES AS SANCTIONS, supra note 20, at 2. 
 148. Hillsman, supra note 2, at 61–62. 
 149. E.g., Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction: 
Monetary Sanctions As Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509, 
519 (2011). 
 150. Pat O’Malley, Politicizing the Case for Fines, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 547, 548–49 (2011) (“Fines and short-term imprisonment thus both 
seemed to be noncorrectional punishments, and fines were less disruptive and 
possibly less criminogenic.”). 
 151. Id. at 550; see also Ruback, Abolition, supra note 116, at 577 (“[O]ne 
goal we might want to have [if fines were to be abolished] is to increase the 
number of intermediate sanctions.”). 
 152. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983) (holding that judges 
cannot impose incarceration as a penalty for nonpayment unless there is a 
hearing that determines that the defendant has the ability to pay, but willfully 
refuses to do so). 
 153. Hillsman, supra note 2, at 53–54. In contrast, in Europe, fines are the 
legally presumptive penalty, constituting, for example, eighty to ninety per-
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can become ineffective if legislatures do not regularly update 
them to adjust for inflation.
154
 Fines that have a statutorily de-
fined and predetermined amount are regressive and do not 
meet the goals of individualized justice. Thus, fines in the 
United States tend to be used primarily in courts of limited ju-
risdiction, particularly traffic courts.
155
 Fines are also used in 
lower courts for minor offenses, such as shoplifting, especially 
for first-time offenders who have enough money to pay the fi-
ne.
156
 In the United States, fines are used in forty-two percent 
of courts of general jurisdiction and eighty-six percent of cases 
in courts of limited jurisdiction.
157
 
For each jurisdiction there is usually a “going rate” for 
fines, that is, what is typically imposed for a particular of-
fense.
158
 Because judges tend to use this going rate for fines, 
they do not adjust the seriousness of the penalty to the particu-
lar defendant.
159
 And, because this going rate is usually low (in 
order to accommodate the poorest offenders), for wealthy of-
fenders, fines often have little punitive value.
160
 Rather than 
make adjustments at initial sentencing, judges tend to make 
adjustments to fines at the back end, when they often excuse 
 
cent of all sentences in Germany and Sweden. Tonry & Lynch, supra note 7, at 
128; FED. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR & FED. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, FIRST 
PERIODICAL REPORT ON CRIME AND CRIME CONTROL IN GERMANY 33 (2001). 
Criminal fines were imposed in about eighty percent of cases in England and 
Wales in 1989. DAVID MOXON, MIKE SUTTON & CAROL HEDDERMAN, UNIT 
FINES: EXPERIMENTS IN FOUR COURTS 1 (1990). One type of fine commonly 
used in Europe is the day fine, which is based on the severity of the crime and 
the offender’s ability to pay (typically, the offender’s daily income). Hillsman, 
supra note 2, at 76. A second type of fine common in Europe is a method to di-
vert the offender from criminal justice processing. Tonry & Lynch, supra note 
7, at 128. If the defendant agrees to pay the fine (typically, the amount that 
would have been imposed had the defendant been convicted), charges are con-
ditionally dismissed. Id. 
 154. See Robert W. Gillespie, Criminal Fines: Do They Pay?, 13 JUST. SYS. 
J. 365, 370 (1988–89) (discussing the impact of changes to the maximum fine 
imposed in drug cases).  
 155. SALLY T. HILLSMAN, JOYCE L. SICHEL & BARRY MAHONEY, FINES IN 
SENTENCING: A STUDY OF THE USE OF THE FINE AS A CRIMINAL SANCTION 2 
(1984).  
 156. HILLSMAN ET AL., FINES AS SANCTIONS, supra note 20, at 2–3. 
 157. David Weisburd, Tomer Einat & Matt Kowalski, The Miracle of the 
Cells: An Experimental Study of Interventions To Increase Payment of Court-
Ordered Financial Obligations, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 9, 12 (2008). 
 158. Sally T. Hillsman & Judith A. Greene, The Use of Fines As an Inter-
mediate Sanction, in SMART SENTENCING: THE EMERGENCE OF INTERMEDIATE 
SANCTIONS 123, 127 (James M. Byrne, Arthur J. Lurigio & Joan Petersilia 
eds., 1992). 
 159. Hillsman, supra note 2, at 63. 
 160. Id. 
1802 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1779 
 
the remaining unpaid portion or simply let the probation period 
expire without enforcing the fine.  
In the late eighteenth century, there was a shift away from 
fines because imprisonment’s effect on liberty was seen as a 
fairer punishment.
161
 A second reason was that imprisonment 
was the likely result for individuals who defaulted on their 
fines.
162
 Although Bentham argued for fines that took into ac-
count the offender’s wealth, European countries in the nine-
teenth century generally opposed the notion because of a reluc-
tance to thoroughly investigate the offender’s assets and a 
concern that punishment should be equal.
163
 
Most countries use fines, which, according to Bentham, 
have several clear advantages: “they were cheap to administer, 
produced revenues, could be completely undone in the event of 
a wrongful conviction being established, could be graduated in-
finitely to match the magnitude of the wrong, could be matched 
to the means of the offender . . . and could be used to provide 
victim compensation.”
164
 
Fines are the legally presumptive penalty in many Euro-
pean countries and thus are much more common there.
165
 In 
Germany, for example, eighty percent of convicted offenders are 
ordered to pay a fine,
166
 and fines are imposed in about eighty 
percent of criminal cases in England and Wales.
167
 Many of the-
se fines in Europe are day fines, which are based on the severi-
ty of the crime and the offender’s ability to pay (typically, the 
offender’s daily income).
168
 Fines in Europe are usually the sole 
sanction, whereas in the United States they are additional 
penalties.
169
 
In the short term, improving knowledge about assets and 
income to inform the imposition of fines is a good idea. Judges, 
prosecuting attorneys, probation officers, and victims will have 
better ideas about the capability of the offender to pay the re-
 
 161. Patricia Faraldo-Cabana, Towards Equalisation of the Impact of the 
Penal Fine: Why the Wealth of the Offender Was Taken into Account, 3 INT’L J. 
FOR CRIME, JUST. & SOC. DEMOCRACY 3, 4 (2014). 
 162. Id. at 5. 
 163. Id. at 6. 
 164. O’Malley, supra note 150, at 550. 
 165. Tonry & Lynch, supra note 7, at 128 (finding that fines are the pre-
sumptive penalty in Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands). 
 166. FED. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR & FED. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 153, at 33. 
 167. MOXON ET AL., supra note 153, at 1. 
 168. Hillsman, supra note 2, at 75–76. 
 169. Id. at 49–50. 
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quired costs. The knowledge might also help offenders, for 
whom the information might be useful for managing their mon-
ey. 
C. COSTS AND FEES  
Costs and fees refer to court-imposed orders to reimburse 
the jurisdiction (local, county, or state) for the administrative 
cost of operating the criminal justice system. One way that the 
terms “costs” and “fees” have been differentiated is that costs 
describe blanket charges for program admission or participa-
tion, whereas fees refer to specific, individual charges for ser-
vices.
170
 In Pennsylvania, for example, there are costs for the 
court-processing expenses associated with a court diversion 
program
171
 and a fee to pay for DNA analysis.
172
 In other juris-
dictions, costs are backward-looking charges for the costs of 
prosecution, whereas fees are forward-looking charges for fu-
ture expenses (e.g., probation supervision).
173
 However, the 
terms are often used interchangeably, and that is how they are 
used in the Model Penal Code and this Article. 
Supervision fees, which are the most common type of spe-
cial condition on probation,
174
 help defray the costs of preparing 
presentence reports and supervising probationers. In some ju-
risdictions, probation departments are self-supported by these 
supervision fees.
175
 Such fees are also a necessity in jurisdic-
tions where correctional budgets do not cover the costs of su-
pervision.
176
 Special services, such as electronic monitoring, re-
quire additional fees.
177
 
There are a large number of costs and fees imposed, and 
most economic sanctions in the United States are fees.
178
 In 
Pennsylvania, for example, each year there are about 2.8 mil-
lion economic sanctions from more than 2,600 different catego-
ries imposed across all offenders, most of which are costs and 
fees.
179
 There is significant variation between counties both in 
 
 170. Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 39, at 253. 
 171. Id. at 253–54. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 174. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS 
OF ADULTS ON PROBATION, 1995, at 6 (1997). 
 175. Olson & Ramker, supra note 6, at 30. 
 176. See Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & JUST. 
149, 171–73 (1997) (discussing the inadequacies in probation funding). 
 177. Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 39, at 254. 
 178. O’Malley, supra note 150, at 548. 
 179. Ruback & Clark, supra note 108, at 770. 
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the number of different types of economic sanctions imposed 
(and the resulting complexity of the system of economic sanc-
tions), and in the average and median amounts of economic 
sanctions imposed per case. In general, counties with larger 
populations and higher percentages of citizens in urban areas 
impose more, and a greater variety of, economic sanctions.  
Aside from county-level differences, there are also signifi-
cant offender-level differences. Most importantly, there are dif-
ferences between individual offenders based on conviction of-
fense. In Pennsylvania, DUI offenders have much higher 
economic sanctions imposed than drug, person, and property 
offenders because they are likely to pay fees in order both to re-
gain their driver’s license and, if they had been admitted to a 
diversionary program, to avoid the stigma of a criminal rec-
ord.
180
 But, in general, fees are likely counterproductive—what 
O’Malley calls “economically irrational”—because they cost 
more to implement than the money that is brought in.
181
 More-
over, the use of fees can interfere with other economic sanc-
tions. “Fees cannot substitute for imprisonment, but fines can; 
fees, unlike fines, are a comparatively recent invention; and 
one reason why so many Americans are imprisoned is because 
fines are used so infrequently.”
182
 
In this Part, I reviewed three major types of economic 
sanctions: restitution, fines, and costs and fees. Although each 
type can serve multiple purposes, restitution is aimed primarily 
at restoring the victim, fines are aimed primarily at punishing 
the offender, and costs and fees are aimed primarily at covering 
some of the expenses of the criminal justice system. Conceptu-
ally, these three types of sanctions are relatively clear, but 
practical issues can make implementation difficult. 
III.  PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND QUESTIONS   
The prior Part defined and discussed economic sanctions in 
the abstract. This Part focuses on problems of implementation. 
Three practical problems are discussed: determining the of-
fender’s ability to pay; assessing the tradeoffs between the 
three types of economic sanctions; and, especially for restitu-
tion, deciding on the order for payment across and within cases. 
 
 180. Id. at 767. 
 181. O’Malley, supra note 150, at 551. 
 182. Id. at 548. 
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A. ABILITY TO PAY 
Economic sanctions, despite the advantages discussed ear-
lier, have several downsides, the primary one being that many 
offenders have limited assets and incomes and may not be able 
to pay completely the economic sanctions that are ordered.
183
 
Thus, when setting the amount of economic sanctions, judges 
may need to consider the offender’s ability to pay so that the 
amount set will be realistic in terms of what the offender will 
actually pay and the payment schedule that is set is more likely 
to be adhered to. Moreover, if the offender perceives the eco-
nomic sanctions as so high as to be impossible to pay, he or she 
is likely to perceive the system as unfair and illegitimate, and, 
as a result, to simply give up attempting to pay.
184
 
In contrast, the primary reason not to consider the offend-
er’s ability to pay when setting the amount of economic sanc-
tions is that a failure to impose the economic sanction means 
that the system considers the offender’s (and the offender’s 
family’s) needs to be greater than those of the victim or society. 
Specifically with reference to restitution, not to impose the 
money devalues the victim and victims generally, perhaps in-
creasing the victim’s psychological distress and making the vic-
tim less likely to cooperate with the criminal justice system in 
the future. Second, looking at the defendant’s ability to pay 
gives the defendant the impression that he or she can get 
around the system. Third, the defendant may at some point 
gain the money to pay the restitution (e.g., through inheritance, 
winning the lottery, tax refund, or recovery in a lawsuit), and 
unless the sanction was imposed, recovery is essentially impos-
sible. There are also issues of hidden income, especially illegal 
income. 
One of the basic issues relating to economic sanctions is 
how a court determines an offender’s ability to pay. Most courts 
do not have a written plan for how such a determination should 
be made.
185
 Courts in Europe can use actual earnings as the ba-
 
 183. See Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1786 (describing offenders’ inability 
to pay legal debt quickly enough to avoid long term liability). 
 184. See id. at 1780 (“The fact that legal debt often grew despite regular 
payments led some [offenders] to feel so frustrated they eventually stopped 
paying.”). 
 185. For example, the city of Montgomery, Alabama was ordered to “submit 
a plan detailing how it intends to assess a debtor’s ability to pay, and what 
alternatives to jail, such as community service, it will provide the indigent.” 
Sarah Stillman, Get Out of Jail, Inc.: Does the Alternatives-to-Incarceration 
Industry Profit from Injustice?, NEW YORKER, June 23, 2014, at 48, 61. A set-
tlement between the city of Montgomery and the Southern Poverty Law Cen-
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sis for imposing economic sanctions, but many governments 
there have access to more information about people than the 
United States government (e.g., income and tax records).
186
 Ac-
curately determining the ability to pay requires that kind of de-
tailed information—tax records, links to the IRS and state 
agencies, listings of all bank accounts, and property owned by 
relatives, to detect property that could have been transferred to 
avoid payment—that judges in the United States currently do 
not have available to them.
187
 Linking imposed economic sanc-
tions to ability to pay will require more detailed, and expensive, 
presentence investigations and the legal authority for probation 
officers to find out detailed information about salaries and all 
assets, including assets that are jointly held. 
In Europe, courts have access to virtually all information 
about assets and income. In the United States, by contrast, 
courts do not have that information. Maricopa County (Phoe-
nix) has a full survey that probationers must complete.
188
 Alt-
hough “ability to pay” on its face seems straightforward, in im-
plementation it can be problematic because offenders’ work can 
be irregular and their monetary obligations (e.g., child support, 
formal or informal loans) can change, thus necessitating con-
tinual monitoring.
189
 
 
ter was announced on August 26, 2014 and is awaiting final approval from the 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama Northern Division. 
SPLC Lawsuit Closes Debtors’ Prison in Alabama Capital, S. POVERTY L. 
CNTR. (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/news/splc 
-lawsuit-closes-debtors-prison-in-alabama-capital. That courts are unable to 
know offenders’ ability to pay is also problematic in the United Kingdom, such 
that judges are unable to accurately set fines and restitution. Miers, supra 
note 38, at 147 (citing MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT AND REFORM: 
EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY SENTENCES, 2012, Cm. 8469 (U.K.)). 
 186. See Hillsman, supra note 2, at 80 (explaining that Swedish courts 
have “access to income and tax records”). 
 187. Ruback, Abolition, supra note 116, at 576–77. 
 188. Maricopa County Adult Probation Department, Payment Ability 
Evaluation, available at https://www.victimsofcrime.org/docs/restitution 
-toolkit/d3_payment-ability-eval-worksheet.pdf. The Maricopa County survey 
is a detailed eight-page form that asks for information about (a) eleven types 
of assets for the offender and for the offender’s spouse, (b) twenty-three 
sources of income for the offender and for the offender’s spouse and (c) sixty-
four different monthly expenses. Id. There is also a self-employed income sup-
plement. Id. Verification is required for all of the information. In Maricopa 
County, offenders are required to complete the form only if they have been de-
linquent in payments. See RACHEL L. MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, 
REPAYING DEBTS 36 (2007), available at https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/ 
media/publications/bja_repaying_debts_guide_2006.pdf (explaining that the 
form must be completed when a payment is 30 days delinquent). 
 189. Mary Fainsod Katzenstein & Mitali Nagrecha, A New Punishment Re-
gime, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 555, 564–65 (2011). 
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Inability to pay debt is a problem that goes beyond crimi-
nal sanctions, as there are real problems today with student 
debt, consumer debt,
190
 and child support.
191
 Given these multi-
ple debts faced by the general population, and especially by of-
fenders facing economic and other criminal justice sanctions, 
there is a need to address these problems in a more integrated 
fashion.
192
  
For offenders, making payments of economic sanctions re-
quires both ability and motivation. Regarding ability, offenders 
everywhere argue that they are not able to make payments. For 
example, in two surveys in Pennsylvania, Ruback and col-
leagues found that offenders report that it would be very diffi-
cult for them to make payments.
193
 Similarly, Harris et al.’s in-
terviews with offenders indicate that economic sanctions strain 
offenders’ ability to meet other needs.
194
 
However, offenders’ claims may need to be discounted 
somewhat. The National Center for State Courts conducted a 
survey of forty courts to determine what practices might work 
to increase economic sanction collections.
195
 Although many 
judges and court managers said they believed that offenders 
did not have the ability to pay fines and fees, the report also 
found that “experienced collectors consistently assert that all 
but a very few defendants have greater resources for meeting 
their obligations than might be immediately apparent.”
196
 Simi-
larly, Weisburd et al. found that offenders will make payments 
if they are threatened with probation revocation for nonpay-
 
 190. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Welcome to Debtors’ Prison, 2011 Edi-
tion, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052748704396504576204553811636610 (calling attention to the 
practice of arresting and jailing consumer debtors for failure to pay). 
 191. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (involving a South Caro-
lina man jailed for failure to pay child support). 
 192. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 36, at 32–33 (outlining a number of 
recommendations to address the extreme costs of “aggressive collection prac-
tices”). 
 193. R. Barry Ruback et al., Perception and Payment of Economic 
Sanctions: A Survey of Offenders, 70 FED. PROBATION 26, 28 (2006). 
 194. Beckett & Harris, supra note 149, at 523; Alexes Harris et al., Courte-
sy Stigma and Monetary Sanctions: Toward a Socio-Cultural Theory of Pun-
ishment, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 234, 237 (2011); Harris et al., Drawing Blood, su-
pra note 3, at 1786–87. 
 195. TOBIN, supra note 35, at 49. 
 196. Id. at 55 (quoting JOHN MATTHIAS ET AL., CURRENT PRACTICES IN 
COLLECTING FINES AND FEES IN STATE COURTS: A HANDBOOK OF COLLECTION 
ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 2 (1995), available at http://cdm16501.contentdm 
.oclc.ord/cdm/ref/collection/financial/id/91). 
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ment, what the authors called the miracle of the cells.
197
 
Threats can work if they are real, that is, if the threat is fol-
lowed with action. But such coercion is expensive, and likely to 
be more expensive than the money returned by the behavior. 
And, there is evidence that at least some offenders who have 
not paid restitution will pay if reminded that they owe the 
money. An experimental study of 767 probationers who were 
delinquent in paying the restitution they owed found that pro-
bationers who were sent information monthly for six months 
about how much restitution they had paid and how much they 
still owed paid significantly more than did individuals who did 
not receive such information.
198
 Because payments continued 
even after the letters stopped, the authors concluded that indi-
viduals had internalized the need to make payments.
199
 
Although payment may be possible for many offenders, 
there is a real problem with obtaining payment from unem-
ployed individuals who have no assets and are in danger of los-
ing their possessions (e.g., car, home). Also problematic are in-
dividuals who realistically can be employed at jobs that are not 
much above minimum wage but would still have problems with 
paying expenses as well as criminal justice costs, fees, and 
fines. The most problematic are individuals who are not em-
ployable for a given reason, such as the mentally ill, a group 
that constitutes about ten-to-fifteen percent of individuals in 
the criminal justice system.
200
 The ability of offenders to pay as-
sessed economic sanctions may also depend, beyond their own 
income and assets, on community characteristics that are re-
lated to offender reentry, such as social service organizations 
(e.g., employment assistance, drug and alcohol treatment), 
commercial establishments, manufacturing employment oppor-
tunities, and unemployment rates.
201
 
The offender’s ability to pay is the ultimate real-world limi-
tation on economic sanctions, in that imposition can have only 
symbolic value if payment is impossible. The issue, though, is 
that in the United States, determining ability to pay is not 
straightforward. 
 
 197. Weisburd et al., supra note 157, at 12. 
 198. Ruback et al., supra note 136, at 421.  
 199. Id. at 425.  
 200. See Matthew W. Epperson et al., Envisioning the Next Generation of 
Behavioral Health and Criminal Justice Interventions, 37 INT’L J.L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 427, 428 (2014) (noting several studies estimating the prevalence 
of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system). 
 201. Jeffrey D. Morenoff & David J. Harding, Incarceration, Prisoner 
Reentry, and Communities, 40 ANN. REV. SOC. 411, 420–21 (2014). 
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Ability to pay concerns not only the question of whether 
economic sanctions should be imposed but also, if they cannot 
all be imposed (and paid), which ones and in what amounts 
should be imposed. This question is of tradeoffs among the dif-
ferent types of economic sanctions. 
B. TRADEOFFS 
Imposing fines and costs and fees means that restitution is 
less likely to be paid. Studies in Pennsylvania, using both 
state-level data
202
 and data from four counties
203
 suggest that 
the imposition of restitution is negatively related to the imposi-
tion of fines. Similarly, in a study of economic sanctions in 
Philadelphia, Ruback found that the imposition of fines was 
negatively related to the imposition of restitution.
204
 On the 
other hand, there could be a positive relationship between eco-
nomic sanctions, a pattern suggesting that judges might believe 
that if offenders can pay one type of sanction, they can pay 
them all. In four counties in Pennsylvania, Ruback et al. found 
that the imposition of costs was positively related to the impo-
sition of fines.
205
 Similarly, in Philadelphia, Ruback found that 
the imposition of costs was positively related to the imposition 
of both restitution and fines.
206
 In their analysis of probation 
fees in Illinois, Olson and Ramker
207
 found, consistent with the 
negative relationship hypothesis, that probationers ordered to 
pay both fines and probation fees had lower average monthly 
fees than probationers ordered to pay only fees. However, they 
also found, consistent with the positive relationship hypothesis, 
that probation fees were more likely to be imposed and more 
likely to be paid if fines were also imposed.
208
  
There is only limited research on the payment of economic 
sanctions, given offenders’ generally inadequate ability to pay 
all of the sanctions that are imposed. However, it is obvious 
that there is a zero-sum issue about how offenders paying to-
ward some sanctions may mean they are not paying toward 
others. Moreover, aside from this issue of tradeoffs between 
 
 202. Ruback et al., supra note 9. 
 203. Ruback et al., supra note 106, at 178–79. 
 204. R. Barry Ruback, The Imposition of Economic Sanctions in Philadel-
phia: Costs, Fines, and Restitution, 68 FED. PROBATION 21, 25 (2004) [herein-
after Ruback, Imposition]. 
 205. Ruback et al., supra note 106, at 179. 
 206. Ruback, Imposition, supra note 204, at 25. 
 207. Olson & Ramker, supra note 6, at 40. 
 208. Id. at 40, 43. 
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types of economic sanctions, there are also questions about 
tradeoffs between cases and between victims. 
C. MULTIPLE CASES AND VICTIMS 
One of the issues regarding the imposition of restitution 
when multiple crimes are involved is which victims should re-
ceive restitution. In some states, victims can be “read-in” to a 
plea agreement, whereas in other states victims can be includ-
ed in a restitution order only if the defendant pleads guilty to 
the offense involving the particular victims.
209
 
Restitution can be problematic because for a single crime, 
there can be multiple victims. Which victim should have prece-
dence? There is further complication when an offender has 
multiple judicial proceedings across time, each proceeding hav-
ing multiple crimes, and each crime having multiple victims.
210
 
Economic sanctions can be difficult to apply because judges 
often do not have accurate information about offenders’ ability 
to pay. Relatedly, because offenders generally cannot pay all 
that they owe, the imposition of economic sanctions calls for 
policy judgments about which type of economic sanction should 
be given precedence. The next section examines principles that 
can serve as the basis for making these policy judgments.  
IV.  RULES FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS   
A problem in the setting of economic sanctions is whether 
they are imposed consistently and fairly. Some research indi-
cates that they are imposed differently with respect to location 
(rural versus urban areas),
211
 type of crime,
212
 and offender 
characteristics.
213
 These differences suggest a need for greater 
uniformity in the imposition of economic sanctions.  
I suggest that the use of economic sanctions should be gov-
erned by three principles: (1) concern for victims, (2) concern for 
offenders, and (3) concern for society. Victims are innocent suf-
ferers who face both tangible and intangible losses. Offenders 
convicted of crimes face a number of challenges, particularly if 
they are incarcerated as part of their sentence. The imposition 
 
 209. Victims Comm., supra note 103, at 11–12. 
 210. This question about determining the primacy of cases and of victims 
within cases is beyond the scope of this article. 
 211. Olson & Ramker, supra note 6, at 43; Ruback et al., supra note 9, at 
333. 
 212. Gordon & Glaser, supra note 143, at 672. 
 213. See Ruback & Shaffer, supra note 9, at 662 (noting several offender 
characteristics judges claimed to consider when ordering restitution). 
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of economic sanctions can be burdensome and may make it 
more difficult for offenders to avoid recidivism, particularly 
when offenders have other expenses (e.g., child support, alimo-
ny, housing, food, transportation). Society’s concerns with re-
storing victims and fairly punishing offenders also include ac-
knowledging governmental responsibilities. 
Table 1 summarizes the positive and negative effects of the 
three types of economic sanctions—restitution, fines, and costs 
and fees—on victims, on offenders, and on society.  
A. RESTITUTION 
For victims, restitution provides an institutionalized 
means by which they can be compensated for their tangible 
losses. Court-imposed restitution also gives victims notice that 
society recognizes the harm they have suffered.  
For offenders, restitution can make them recognize the 
harm they have caused, can teach them responsibility by mak-
ing them pay for that harm, and can serve as both a punish-
ment and deterrent.
214
 Although offenders perceive restitution 
as somewhat unfair, they still perceive it as more fair than oth-
er economic sanctions.
215
 
Some studies have reported that the process of making 
amends for one’s actions is what makes restitution effective.
216
 
That is, offenders who recognize the reparative benefits of res-
titution have lower recidivism rates. These studies suggest that 
restitution may be effective because it emphasizes the benefits 
to the victim and allows offenders to take responsibility for 
their actions without stigmatizing them.
217
 Likewise, research 
has indicated that successful completion of a restitution order 
is generally one of the strongest predictors of lowered recidi-
vism.
218
 
Studies of juveniles have shown that although formal resti-
tution (i.e., as a condition of probation or assigned through 
 
 214. MCGILLIS, supra note 22, at 13. 
 215. Ruback et al., supra note 193, at 30. 
 216. See Patricia Van Voorhis, Restitution Outcome and Probationers’ As-
sessments of Restitution: The Effects of Moral Development, 12 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 259, 279 (1985) (“Offenders who were rated as orienting to reparation 
as the most salient concern were significantly more likely to complete restitu-
tion successfully.”). 
 217. Id. at 282. 
 218. Laurie Ervin & Anne Schneider, Explaining the Effects of Restitution 
on Offenders: Results from a National Experiment in Juvenile Courts, in 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION 183, 189 (Burt 
Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1978). 
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court) may be less effective than more informal restitution ar-
rangements (i.e., residential programs or court diversion), it is 
still more effective than straight probation or incarceration.
219
 
Studies have shown that reoffense rates for restitution cases 
increase monotonically with the degree of court control.
220
 In 
contrast, a study of juveniles in Utah found positive effects for 
restitution regardless of whether juveniles were processed for-
mally or informally, although the effect was more dramatic 
among the informally-processed group.
221
 In general, studies 
examining the effectiveness of restitution among juveniles have 
shown that juveniles who pay restitution have lower rearrest 
rates than juveniles who receive other sanctions.
222
  
Research on the use of restitution with adults is limited 
but shows similar trends. In one study, adults in the Minnesota 
Restitution Center who had to pay restitution had lower recidi-
vism rates than a group of incarcerated offenders.
223
 Likewise, 
another study, which performed a two-year follow-up of adult 
parolees, found that those randomly assigned to the Minnesota 
Restitution Center had fewer new court commitments than 
those on standard parole.
224
 
Finally, for society, restitution promotes the idea of restor-
ative justice, by which the victims are compensated for their 
losses and offenders can be reintegrated into society. The prob-
lem, though, is that the payment of restitution interferes with 
the payment of economic sanctions that go to the state (primar-
ily fines) and that go to the local jurisdiction (primarily costs 
and fees). 
 
 219. See M.S. Rowley, Recidivism of Juvenile Offenders in a Diversion Res-
titution Program (Compared to a Matched Group of Offenders Processed 
Through Court), in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION 
supra note 218, at 217, 223 (observing that a study of offenders in a formal 
restitution program compared to those not participating in restitution “indi-
cated a clear difference . . . for both incidence and severity of subsequent of-
fending”). 
 220. Peter R. Schneider et al., Juvenile Restitution As a Sole Sanction or 
Condition of Probation: An Empirical Analysis, 19 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 
47, 59 (1982). 
 221. JEFFREY A. BUTTS & HOWARD N. SNYDER, RESTITUTION AND 
JUVENILE RECIDIVISM 4 (1992). 
 222. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 80, at 549–50 (concluding that restitu-
tion reduces recidivism for juvenile offenders). 
 223. Joe Heinz et al., Restitution or Parole: A Follow-up Study of Adult 
Offenders, 50 SOC. SERV. REV. 148, 155 (1976). 
 224. Joe Hudson & Steven Chesney, Research on Restitution: A Review and 
Assessment, in OFFENDER RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND ACTION 131, 139 (Burt 
Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1978). 
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B. FINES 
For victims, fines have no benefits but do have costs in that 
monies directed at paying fines interfere with the payment of 
restitution. For offenders, fines can serve goals of deterrence 
and punishment, and they can be used as intermediate pun-
ishments. For society, fines can be used for general governmen-
tal purposes, or they can be directed to specific purposes, such 
as the victim compensation fund. From the viewpoint of society, 
money used to pay fines may be money that is not being di-
rected to victim restitution or to costs and fees. 
C. COSTS AND FEES 
For victims, costs and fees have no benefits, but do have 
costs in that monies directed at paying fines interfere with the 
payment of restitution, since payment of restitution orders typ-
ically follows other financial obligations (e.g., costs, fines).
225
  
For offenders, costs and fees can serve goals of deterrence 
and punishment. However, offenders often perceive costs and 
fees as unfair.
226
 Costs and fees can also greatly interfere with 
an offender’s ability to function in society, particularly when 
there are surcharges (e.g., interest) on amounts that remain 
unpaid.
227
 For some offenders, the amounts of these costs and 
fees, especially continuing ones like supervision fees, are so 
high that they can never be paid off, which is the situation with 
the private probation companies in the South.
228
 
For society, costs and fees can cover some of the costs of the 
criminal justice system, but they transfer governmental duties 
to offenders. Moreover, because these costs and fees are likely 
to go primarily to criminal justice administrators in local juris-
dictions, they interfere with the payment of restitution (mean-
ing victims are less likely to receive compensation) and fines 
(meaning that the state is less likely to receive funds). In addi-
tion, costs and fees are the responsibility of government, and 
the Model Penal Code correctly notes that costs and fees for re-
 
 225. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 9, at 357–58 (noting that 
“restitution orders often are not first in the priority of court ordered pay-
ments”). 
 226. See Ruback et al., supra note 193, at 30 (“[O]ffenders did not perceive 
the amounts of the economic sanctions or the procedures used to determine 
them to be very fair.”). 
 227. See Beckett & Harris, supra note 149, at 518 (observing that, due to 
surcharges and interest, legal debt often grows over time despite regular pay-
ments). 
 228. See discussion infra Part V.B.2. 
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imbursing the criminal justice system cause a conflict of inter-
est in the courts and agencies that impose, collect, and use the-
se monies.
229
 Moreover, costs and fees are of little or no benefit 
to society, although private corporations seem to profit from the 
arrangement. 
The threat of incarceration for nonpayment of fees works 
only if the threat is real. That is, courts must be willing to in-
carcerate individuals for nonpayment, as Weisburd et al. found 
in their study.
230
 The costs of this enforcement are borne by so-
ciety.
231
  
Probation revocation for failure to pay economic sanctions 
alone is probably relatively uncommon. Felony probationers 
may have more than one violation and may have more than one 
disciplinary hearing.
232
 Most often, judges are reluctant to in-
carcerate individuals for nonpayment because they are aware 
of the monetary and social costs of incarceration.
233
 Wheeler et 
al. found that in only seven percent of felonies and three per-
cent of misdemeanors, judges revoked probation for nonpay-
ment or failure to report.
234
 Another study found that twelve 
percent of probation revocations resulted at least in part from a 
failure to pay court-ordered financial obligations.
235
 In sum, the 
failure to pay economic sanctions is often simply one of several 
reasons why an individual might face probation revocation.  
 
 229. Kevin R. Reitz, The Economic Rehabilitation of Offenders: Recommen-
dations of the Model Penal Code (Second), 99 MINN. L. REV. 1735, 1760–66 
(2015). 
 230. Weisburd et al., supra note 157, at 30. 
 231. The Brennan Center study indicated there is a cost of $130 per pris-
oner per day for incarcerations in California. BANNON ET AL., supra note 36, at 
25. Even when private companies are involved, government bears the costs of 
enforcement. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: 
AMERICA’S “OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 53 (2014), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/print/reports/2014/02/05/profiting-probation (explaining 
that governments still bear the cost of housing offenders when probation com-
panies use incarceration to collect on debts). 
 232. BONCZAR, supra note 174, at 10 tbl.12. 
 233. See Ruback, Imposition, supra note 204, at 21 (observing that “there 
are pressures for alternatives to prison, because of the high cost of incarcera-
tion”); Gerald R. Wheeler et al., Economic Sanctions in Criminal Justice: Di-
lemma for Human Service?, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 63, 74–75 (1990) (presenting data 
that “showed a strong pattern of judicial tolerance for non-compliance”).  
 234. Gerald R. Wheeler et al., The Effects of Probation Service Fees on Case 
Management Strategy and Sanctions, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 15, 22 (1989). 
 235. ROBYN L. COHEN, PROBATION AND PAROLE VIOLATORS IN STATE 
PRISON, 1991 3 (1995). 
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Economic sanctions can be useful as penalties for defend-
ants who are wealthy,
236
 and these sanctions may be of greater 
benefit to society and the criminal justice system if applied to 
those who committed economic crimes like stock fraud and 
money laundering. The Model Penal Code also takes this ap-
proach, arguing that for offenders with the means to pay eco-
nomic sanctions, “financial penalties would remain an im-
portant part of the sentencing armamentarium.”
237
 But it may 
be useful to greatly reduce economic sanctions for the poor be-
cause they are not likely to be cost effective.
238
 
 236. See Dickman, supra note 51, at 1711 (observing that, while many of-
fenders are poor, there are some who “have the financial means to compensate 
victims” but that “restitution orders are not being adequately enforced against 
affluent offenders”). 
 237. AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING: COUNCIL DRAFT 
NO. 4, at xviii (2013). 
 238. Dickman, supra note 51, at 1694–96. 
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Table 1. Type and Effects (Positive and Negative) of 
Economic Sanctions  
 
 
V.  CONCLUSIONS   
This overview of the effects of the three different types of 
economic sanctions leads to three conclusions: (1) restitution 
should be mandatory; (2) costs and fees should not be imposed; 
and (3) judges should be able to impose fines, based on the of-
fender’s ability to pay. 
A. RESTITUTION SHOULD BE MANDATORY 
Restitution should be mandatory because it is good for vic-
tims, good for offenders, and good for society, and the fact that 
restitution is not mandatory may reflect subtle victim blam-
ing.
239
 The need to focus on victims is based on the fact that vic-
 
 239. The difficulty victims face in getting compensation from the state may 
also reflect a subtle bias against victims. See ROBERT ELIAS, THE POLITICS OF 
VICTIMIZATION (1986). 
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tims, not governments, bear the greatest costs of crime.
240
 Alt-
hough it has been argued in the United Kingdom that reducing 
the costs of crime to victims is not a concern of the govern-
ment,
241
 the fact that victim restitution is authorized in every 
state, including twenty that include it in the state constitution, 
suggests that the costs victims endure are of concern to state 
and local governments in the United States. Most of the eco-
nomic losses victims suffer are not covered by insurance or, in 
the United States, recompensed by government.
242
 In other 
countries, victims’ losses are covered by the state, which com-
pensates the losses because of the violation of its duty to pro-
tect citizens or because of a social welfare rationale.
243
 
Restitution is qualitatively different from other types of 
economic sanctions in that the funds go to the victim rather 
than to a state agency. The amount of restitution awarded de-
pends on the victim impact statement that the victim files with, 
depending on the jurisdiction, the victim/witness agency or the 
prosecutor.
244
 Amounts are for documented losses (e.g., the val-
ue of vandalized property) and out-of-pocket expenses (e.g., 
medical costs) directly related to the crime.
245
 Restitution is ar-
guably good for offenders because it teaches them responsibil-
ity. And, restitution is good for society because of the symbolic 
value attached to treating victims fairly and to emphasizing the 
importance of restoring the victim to the status quo before the 
crime.  
If victim restitution is not made mandatory, then there is a 
need to ensure that the state assumes the responsibility under 
one or more of three rationales:  
The philosophical basis for these programs varies from a legal tort 
theory, whereby the state is seen to have failed to protect its citizens 
adequately, to a humanitarian rationale through which all citizens 
should receive assistance for their compelling needs, to a by-products 
theory that recognizes victim satisfaction as a benefit to the criminal  
In most jurisdictions, victims’ requests for restitution can 
 
 240. Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather Strang, Restorative Justice As Evi-
dence-Based Sentencing, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS 215, 228 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Victim compensation covers only a tiny fraction of crimes, because vic-
tims are often unaware of the state funding and, even if they were aware, 
there are so many qualifying conditions that most victims would not be enti-
tled to receive any state funding. 
 243. See Robert Elias, Alienating the Victim: Compensation and Victim At-
titudes, 40 J. SOC. ISSUES 103, 106 (1984). 
 244. MCGILLIS, supra note 22. 
 245. NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 9.  
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be part of a more general process of victim allocution at sen-
tencing, in which the victim describes the impact of the crime. 
The primary purposes of victim participation in sentencing are 
to increase victim satisfaction with sentencing and criminal 
justice, to make the determination of crime seriousness more 
accurate, and to make both criminal justice professionals and 
the offender more aware of the actual effects of the crime.
247
 
Although victim participation may accomplish these goals, it 
has also been criticized because it could lead to inconsistent 
sentencing (e.g., because of differential participation by victims 
or differential persuasiveness of victims),
248
 to overly harsh sen-
tences, and to a violation of the decorum of the courtroom.
249
  
In contrast to victim allocution in general, restitution is a 
relatively straightforward process that involves less discretion 
on the part of the judge. Providing restitution to victims could 
be explicitly part of a more general process of restorative jus-
tice, by which there can be reconciliation between the offender 
and the victim, the victim’s losses are restored, and the offend-
er is returned to the community. In this way, restitution could 
play a role in promoting rehabilitation. 
But even if restitution is not paid, there are important 
symbolic aspects to the imposition of restitution. In a survey of 
Pennsylvania judges, one judge wrote that, “Many judges in my 
county feel criminals are not capable of paying restitution. My 
experience has been they will pay if they face jail.”
250
 Even so, it 
was much more common for judges to indicate that they had no 
real expectation that the restitution would be paid. For exam-
ple, another judge said, “This court expends significant re-
sources, including regularly scheduled collection court proceed-
ings, to collect limited amounts of ordered restitution due to 
low income levels and poverty. Nevertheless, even collection of 
small amounts reinforces the restorative nature of the judicial 
system and the need to reinforce accountability to offenders.”
251
 
This recognition that much of the imposed restitution will 
not be paid suggests that a judge’s purpose in ordering it is 
primarily symbolic. The fact that restitution was made manda-
 
 247. Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the Crime Victim: Evaluating Victim 
Input at Sentencing and Parole, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH 347 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009).  
 248. Julian V. Roberts, Crime Victims, Sentencing, and Release from Pris-
on, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra note 
240, at 104, 107–11. 
 249. Roberts, supra note 247. 
 250. RUBACK, RESTITUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 110. 
 251. Id. 
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tory is similar to other victims’ rights actions taken by state 
legislatures, such as victim compensation and victim impact 
statements, which many believe are more aimed at giving the 
appearance of concern for victims rather than actually improv-
ing their condition.
252
  
B. COSTS AND FEES SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED 
Offenders should not have to pay costs and fees. Thus, I 
agree with the “categorical abolitionist position” taken by the 
Model Penal Code.
253
 This issue is real, in that convicted of-
fenders are often called on to pay for the costs of criminal jus-
tice. Most clearly, a National Public Radio report in 2014 by Jo-
seph Shapiro reported that forty-three states allow a charge for 
a public defender, forty-one states charge for jail, and forty-four 
states charge for probation.
254
 
1. The Activities Covered by Costs and Fees Are Inherently 
Governmental Responsibilities 
The argument against imposing costs and fees on convicted 
offenders is based on the distinction between general taxes, on 
the one hand, and benefit taxes and user fees on the other.
255
 
General taxes are government levies on income, consumption, 
property, or wealth and are used to support general public ser-
vices.
256
 Income taxes, corporate taxes, and sales taxes are ex-
amples of general taxes.  
In contrast, “benefit taxes and user fees constitute manda-
tory or voluntary levies imposed on persons deriving particular 
 
 252. Elias, supra note 243; Edna Erez & Pamela Tontodonato, The Effect of 
Victim Participation in Sentencing on Sentence Outcome, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 
451, 453 (1990). 
 253. Reitz, supra note 229, at 1760. In the report by the Brennan Center 
for Justice entitled Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry, authors 
Bannon, Nagrecha, and Diller argued that the problem is user fees, which are 
explicitly intended to raise revenue. BANNON ET AL., supra note 36, at 4. Legis-
lators do not give much thought to the consequences of raising the amounts for 
old fees or creating new fees. Id. The analysis conducted by the authors exam-
ined laws and policies in the fifteen states with the largest prison populations. 
This excellent study recommended that fees be discontinued, particularly fees 
that impose additional costs on the indigent, such as payment plan fees, late 
fees, collection fees, and interest. The report also recommended that fees for 
legal representation by a public defender be eliminated. See id. at 32–33.  
 254. Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, The Poor Are Paying the Price, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 19, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/ 
increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor.  
 255. See David Duff, Benefit Taxes and User Fees in Theory and Practice, 
54 U. TORONTO L.J. 391 (2004). 
 256. Id. at 391. 
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benefits from specific categories of publicly provided goods and 
services.”
257
 Benefit taxes and user fees differ in the extent to 
which the benefit goes to a group or an individual. Benefit tax-
es are “compulsory levies applied to individuals (or institutions 
such as corporations) who are assumed to benefit as a group 
from certain government services.”
258
 Taxes on gasoline and 
diesel fuel are benefit taxes because the drivers paying these 
taxes are members of the group of vehicle owners who benefit 
from the use of government-owned roads and highways.
259
 
User fees are amounts “levied on consumers of government 
goods or services in relation to their consumption.”
260
 With user 
fees, the amount of special benefits delivered to an individual 
can be identified, along with the financing paid by the individ-
ual. To the extent that charges for water, sewage, and waste 
disposal are related to the consumption of the service, these 
charges are user fees.
261
 “The designation of user fees can also 
be applied to charges for the use of public transit or public rec-
reational facilities, tuition fees for higher education, road or 
bridge tolls, resource royalties, and various kinds of environ-
mental taxes.”
262
 Under these definitions, the costs and fees im-
posed on convicted offenders are user fees. 
Benefit taxes and user fees have both advantages and dis-
advantages. As an advantage, they increase economic efficien-
cy, because they cause resources to go to the most highly valued 
uses.
263
 They also increase the accountability of the public sec-
tor because they are more responsive to the public’s demand for 
goods and services, and they are more fair, since taxpayers pay 
only for those goods and services that they use.
264
 Benefit taxes 
and user fees are criticized, however, because they may be more 
 
 257. Id. at 393. 
 258. Richard M. Bird & Thomas Tsiopoulos, User Charges for Public Ser-
vices: Potentials and Problems, 45 CAN. TAX J. 25, 38–39 (1997). 
 259. See Duff, supra note 255, at 394. 
 260. Bird & Tsiopoulos, supra note 258, at 39. The Government Accounta-
bility Office describes federal user fees and charges as being “generally related 
to some voluntary transaction or request for government goods or services be-
yond what is normally available to the public such as fees for national park 
entrance, patent applications, and customs inspections. . . . [W]ell-designed 
user fees can reduce the burden on taxpayers to finance those portions of ac-
tivities that provide benefits to identifiable users.” GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 278 (2012), available at http://www 
.gao.gov/assets/590/588818.pdf. 
 261. Duff, supra note 255, at 394. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 395. 
 264. Id. at 395–96. 
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burdensome on the poor than on the wealthy, they undermine 
the entire notion of publicly provided goods and services, and 
budgetary flexibility is undermined if the revenues are ear-
marked for specific purposes.
265
 David Duff argues that benefit 
taxes and user fees are appropriate for some purposes (e.g., 
transportation, water, sewage, waste disposal), inappropriate 
for others (social services, public housing), and, in between, ap-
propriate if access is granted on the basis of right or need (e.g., 
health care, education).
266
  
According to Duff, most publicly provided goods provide 
both general benefits and specific benefits.
267
 For example, a 
public park provides spaces for interactions for everyone and 
recreation for individuals.
268
 Similarly, public health interven-
tions can reduce the impact of epidemics, benefiting both the 
general welfare and the health of individuals.
269
 Public and in-
dividual benefits also accompany publicly funded education, 
transportation, and waste disposal programs.
270
 
Although it would be possible to fund these publicly pro-
vided services through a benefits tax or user fee, there are four 
reasons why charging such fees is not appropriate. First, when 
the good or service is fundamentally public, charging fees to in-
dividual users changes the nature of the good or service.
271
 
Thus, police protection, a public service, is fundamentally 
changed to an individual service when individuals are charged 
for their level of protection. Second, when benefits are distrib-
uted by right, need, or merit, benefit taxes and user fees are in-
appropriate.
272
 For example, if primary education is seen as a 
right of citizenship, then it would be wrong to charge stu-
dents.
273
 Third, when the purpose of the public expenditure is to 
redistribute resources, as with welfare payments, it makes no 
sense to charge individual beneficiaries.
274
 Finally, if the bene-
fits tax or user fee is regressive (i.e., has a disproportionate im-
pact on the poor), the charge is probably unfair and inappropri-
ate unless there are some ways to offset the effect.
275
 
 
 265. Id. at 396. 
 266. Id. at 447. 
 267. Id. at 411. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 412. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 413. 
 275. Id. 
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According to Duff’s analysis, it is economically inefficient to 
charge the cost to the user when there are public benefits, as 
there are with public education.
276
 There is a continuum be-
tween pure public goods and pure private goods, which mirrors 
the continuum between public funding and charging specific 
users.
277
 In both Canada and the United States, user fees and 
benefit taxes are more likely to be used at the local level rather 
than the state or national level,
278
 a fact that is explainable be-
cause federal level expenditures are primarily social assistance 
and national defense (a pure public good).
279
  
Duff argues that education (primary and secondary) and 
health services benefit both the general public and individu-
als.
280
 Moreover, because basic education is a right and health 
care is a need, he argues that a user fee approach based on abil-
ity and willingness to pay would undermine the public bene-
fits.
281
 Duff argues that the protection of persons and property 
is not a proper subject for benefit taxes and user fees because of 
the more general public benefits.
282
 
Duff argues that even if benefit taxes and user fees are ap-
propriately imposed, the amount of the charges must still be 
appropriate—“an economically sensible amount.”
283
 Duff speaks 
in terms of the marginal cost of production, such that rates 
should match the short-run marginal cost of producing the good 
or service,
284
 although there must also be a consideration of 
general benefits, uncompensated costs to third parties, and the 
possible need for more complicated pricing arrangements when 
there are declining marginal costs or substantial fixed costs.
285
 
Opportunity costs must also be considered. 
The government should not be contracting out inherently 
governmental functions. The question, though, is what makes a 
function fundamentally public rather than private. Professor 
Martha Minow suggests that the answer depends on traditional 
practices, symbolism, and political theories about the role of 
government.
286
 For example, because criminal prosecution has 
 
 276. Id. at 416. 
 277. Bird & Tsiopoulos, supra note 258, at 39–40. 
 278. Duff, supra note 255, at 420–21. 
 279. Id. at 423. 
 280. Id. at 426. 
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 282. Id. at 427. 
 283. Id. at 429. 
 284. Id. at 414. 
 285. Id. at 417–18. 
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been handled primarily by the government for the past 200 
years and because it has symbolism as a public action for the 
good of the community and private victims, it is unlikely that it 
would be contracted out to a private actor. The danger with 
private actors, especially for-profit groups, is that “the appear-
ance of private motives in a public domain can undermine re-
spect for government and even generate doubt whether the 
government is sincerely pursuing public purposes.”
287
 
One of the arguments for privatizing governmental func-
tions is to reduce the size of government. Actually, of course, 
governmental functions have merely been outsourced,
288
 creat-
ing a government by proxy.
289
 Four arguments have been made 
in favor of privatization: (a) increasing quality and effective-
ness; (b) creating competition and incentives for improvement; 
(c) increasing pluralism, that is, giving groups the opportunity 
to participate and self-govern; and (d) creating new knowledge 
and infrastructure.
290
 
DiIulio argues that efficiency is not the only criterion for 
“deciding who should make public policy, who should adminis-
ter public policy, and who should fund public policy.”
291
 Accord-
ing to DiIulio, it is difficult to separate making and administer-
ing public policy, since so much discretion is generally involved 
in translating policy into action. Although DiIulio suggests that 
“[i]t is easier to separate finance from administration than it is 
to separate policymaking from administration,” funding deci-
sions still involve policy determinations.
292
 
If there is to be contracting out of governmental functions, 
the key is public accountability,
293
 which, following Hirsch-
man,
294
 means that governments “retain the option to exit rela-
tionships with private entities, the means to express disagree-
ments with the ways in which the private entities proceed, and 
the capacity to remain with the private entity as a vote of con-
fidence.”
295
 Government accountability comes through contracts 
 
New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1234 (2003). 
 287. Id. at 1234. 
 288. Id. at 1240. 
 289. See John J. DiIulio, Jr., Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1271 (2003). 
 290. Minow, supra note 286, at 1242–46. 
 291. DiIulio, supra note 289, at 1283. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Minow, supra note 286, at 1259. 
 294. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
 295. Minow, supra note 286, at 1266. 
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that specify terms and enforcement, are consistent with the 
constitutional obligations of government, and require the re-
porting of information needed to assess compliance.
296
 
In terms of costs and fees in the criminal justice system, 
these costs have been imposed because there is no one to argue 
against them. Offenders generally do not have the right to vote, 
and, even if they do, they have little influence over criminal 
justice policy.
297
  
Governments are charging defendants with costs that are 
the business of government. Moreover, when states charge de-
fendants for an attorney to defend them, these charges amount 
to a fee for exercising a constitutional right. Such charges are 
an abdication of governmental responsibility, in the same way 
that devolving the collection and monitoring of these charges to 
private businesses is an improper delegation of duty.  
2. If a Government Imposes Costs and Fees, Then the 
Government, Not Private Businesses, Should Collect and 
Monitor the Payment of Those Charges 
In recent years, private corporations have begun operating 
criminal justice services that had previously been performed by 
the government. Because they have a pecuniary interest in the 
behavior of the offenders they deal with, specifically wanting 
the offenders to continue making payments on the original 
owed amounts and on any additional fees, penalties, and sur-
charges that may have accrued, the field has become known as 
“poverty capitalism”
298
 and an “‘offender-funded’ probation in-
dustry.”
299
 
There are two reasons why local governments contract out 
this work to private companies.
300
 First, these contracts reduce 
the costs of government and therefore the need to increase tax-
es to pay for the covered services.
301
 Second, because these add-
ed costs are borne by offenders, they amount to an additional 
punishment beyond what had traditionally been imposed on 
 
 296. Id. at 1267–68. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Thomas B. Edsall, The Expanding World of Poverty Capitalism, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/opinion/thomas 
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convicted offenders.
302
  
According to a Human Rights Watch report, companies 
that supervise offender-funded probation have an incentive for 
offenders not to pay off the amounts they owe: “[T]he longer it 
takes offenders to pay off their debts, the longer they remain on 
probation and the more they pay in supervision fees.”
303
 
That local governments need the money provided by fines 
and fees became apparent in response to concerns about police 
stops of motorists after the shooting of Michael Brown in Fer-
guson, Missouri in August 2014. Slightly more than twenty 
percent of the city’s $12.75 million budget came from municipal 
court fines,
304
 and more than a third of the general revenues in 
one nearby town came from court fines and fees.
305
 
One of the primary criticisms of private companies being 
involved in the criminal justice system is that they are profiting 
from the misfortunes of victims and offenders.
306
 Moreover, 
their focus on profit may cause them to want offenders not to 
succeed, so that they can make more money.
307
 DiIulio believes 
that profit per se is not the factor that precludes the privatiza-
tion of criminal justice functions; rather, the legally-sanctioned 
control over crime and punishment are inherently public be-
cause criminal justice actors act on behalf of the public.
308
 In-
deed, criminal justice is one of the central functions of govern-
ment.
309
 
Just as DiIulio believes that government can be successful 
at managing prisons,
310
 there is also reason to believe that pro-
bation officers can do a better job, not only of supervising of-
fenders, but of inducing offenders to pay the economic sanctions 
they owe. Some evidence suggests that when specialized collec-
tions agencies are involved in the collection of costs and fees, 
the amount of money recovered is actually less than when pro-
 
 302. Id. at 22; see also Beckett & Harris, supra note 149, at 517. 
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bation officers are supervising the procedure.
311
  
One of the real problems with private probation companies 
is what is called “pay only” probation, which refers to individu-
als who are on probation not because of a threat to public safety 
or need for supervision, but only because they owe fees.
312
 Pri-
vate probation agencies generally deal with offenders “whose 
offenses are often too minor to merit jail time.”
313
 The Human 
Rights Watch report indicates that although the private proba-
tion companies account for the fees due to the court, they do not 
report on the amount of fees paid to the company itself.
314
 
The Human Rights Watch report argues that pay-only pro-
bation is discriminatory for three reasons: (1) offenders have to 
pay supervision fees only if they do not pay the total amount of 
their fines immediately; (2) the fees are regressive because 
poorer probationers pay a larger percentage of their payments 
in fees than do individuals who can afford to make larger pay-
ments and because poorer probationers have to stay on proba-
tion for a longer period of time because they make smaller 
payments; and (3) poorer individuals pay absolutely more in 
fees because they are on probation longer.
315
 
For the companies that Human Rights Watch observed, of-
fenders could not pay off their debts to the court before their 
debt to the private probation company because the companies 
ensured that the two debts were paid down simultaneously.
316
 
There is a hidden cost to the public for these fees, in that the 
real threat for nonpayment is jail-time, a cost borne by the pub-
lic, and one that might be greater than the amount of money 
owed to the court.
317
 The Human Rights Watch report found 
that courts often not only did not supervise the private proba-
tion agencies but also “delegate[d] a range of coercive powers to 
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their probation companies.”
318
 
The Human Rights Watch report concluded that courts do 
little to determine whether offenders are actually able to pay 
their fines and fees.
319
 Moreover, the private probation compa-
nies have a direct interest in making sure that courts do not 
decide that an offender is not able to pay the debt.
320
 The report 
couched the argument in terms of human rights issues.
321
 Given 
the public nature of the functions covered by costs and fees, 
they should not be imposed on offenders. Moreover, given the 
risks associated with privatizing their collection, if they are 
imposed, they should be collected by government agencies. 
C. JUDGES SHOULD HAVE DISCRETION TO IMPOSE FINES BASED 
ON THE DEFENDANT’S ABILITY TO PAY 
Judge should have the ability to impose fines, particularly 
if these fines are used in lieu of incarceration. Judges should be 
able to impose these fines based on the defendant’s ability to 
pay and the impact of these fines on the defendant’s family and 
dependents. Regarding fines, the Model Penal Code suggests 
that, because there is little “punitive ‘value’” to economic sanc-
tions, “economic sanctions other than victim restitution may 
not be made formal ‘conditions’ of probation or postrelease su-
pervision—meaning that nonpayment cannot be a basis for 
sentence revocation.”
322
  
With respect to fines, I think it is too early to know wheth-
er fines can be useful for deterrence and rehabilitation.
323
 How-
ever, given the generally successful use of fines in Europe
324
 and 
the need for some type of intermediate sanction short of incar-
ceration, judges should have the option to impose fines, particu-
larly for offenders whose crimes are linked to economic offens-
es.  
The key point is that fines should be imposed based on 
ability to pay. Most writers today advocate imposing financial 
obligations that are based on the offender’s ability to pay. 
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McLean and Thompson suggested capping amounts at twenty 
percent of an offender’s income and creating realistic payment 
plans.
325
 Dickman suggested removing the mandatory amounts 
beyond the offender’s ability to pay.
326
 
VI.  MORE REALISTIC SUGGESTIONS   
My suggestion of completely eliminating costs and fees is 
unlikely to be implemented. Thus, I suggest some modifications 
short of that dramatic change.
327
  
A. REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COSTS AND FEES, ESPECIALLY AT 
THE COUNTY LEVEL  
In our research in Pennsylvania, we have found that most 
of the different economic sanctions (ninety percent of 2629 dif-
ferent sanctions) relate to county-level user costs and fees.
328
 
These fees are primarily aimed at generating funds for the 
county rather than punishing, deterring, or rehabilitating of-
fenders.
329
 A reduction in the number of such fees would reduce 
the economic burden on offenders. 
The fact that there are more than 2600 different economic 
sanctions in Pennsylvania is confusing not only to offenders, 
who do not know how much they owe, how much their monthly 
payments should be, and where the money they pay goes,
330
 but 
also to judges, prosecutors, and probation officers. Conversa-
tions with court employees suggest that no one in the court sys-
tem understands all of the economic sanctions or the order in 
which they are supposed to be paid,
331
 despite regulations es-
tablished by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and promul-
gated by the Court Administrator of Pennsylvania.
332
 If clarity 
is one goal of the legal system, then economic sanctions in 
Pennsylvania do not meet this standard.  
Moreover, this variety of sanctions is unfair to individuals 
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in counties that have a larger number of economic sanctions, 
most of which are county costs and fees. These costs and fees 
are imposed to shift the financial burden from the public to of-
fenders, and counties with more of these costs and fees place 
more of the burden on offenders. Unfairness can occur when 
similar offenders in two different counties face different 
amounts of costs and fees solely because one county imposes a 
greater number of costs and fees.  
One possible solution to the problem of so many different 
types of economic sanctions is simply to reduce the number of 
county costs and fees.
333
 The large number of possible county-
level economic sanctions explains most of the variation between 
counties, and essentially the system as it presently stands re-
wards counties that are more creative in creating new costs and 
fees. As long as the imposed costs and fees are consistent across 
counties, one could claim that they are uniform and therefore 
fair.  
However, costs and fees that are unique to a county raise a 
different question. How fair is it to an offender if the burden of 
paying for the costs of criminal justice is shifted to offenders on-
ly if the county is poor and therefore cannot afford to pay? Or, 
is it fair if the county has a large population of citizens who 
generally oppose government and is therefore more likely than 
populations in other counties to favor user fees? Although one 
could argue that counties should be able to impose whatever 
fees they wish, it would be difficult to defend these sanctions in 
terms of fairness to offenders. That is, it would be difficult to 
argue that offenders who live in certain counties should have to 
pay higher costs and fees merely because of where they live, not 
because of their actual offense.  
B. MAKE PAYMENTS EASIER 
The National Center for State Courts recommended that 
collection of economic sanctions is likely to be improved if 
courts make payments more convenient, for example through 
 
 333. Recently, there have been calls for the abolition of these fees for three 
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BANNON ET AL., supra note 36, at 32, have called for lawmakers to consider 
the total debt burden on offenders before adding new fees or increasing fee 
amounts. They also have suggested that indigent offenders should not have to 
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credit-card payments, installment plans, incentive plans that 
reduce amounts for those who comply with payment plans, 
community service, and day fines based on income levels.
334
 The 
notion behind the day-fine concept was that offenders should be 
able to afford necessities less “the amount that serves to satisfy 
pleasures, whatever these may be, such as wine, spirits and to-
bacco,”
335
 a concept that is also embodied in the Model Penal 
Code’s notion of “reasonable living expenses.”
336
 
Questions remain concerning the degree to which offenders 
should be allowed flexibility in payment. Events that make it 
difficult or impossible for the offender to pay (e.g., illness, los-
ing a job) are probably more likely among offenders than the 
general public, thus suggesting that offenders should be al-
lowed flexibility. Other questions relate to whether there 
should be garnishment of wages, welfare payments, and tax re-
funds.  
C. PRIORITIZE THE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS 
Much of the objection to the current system of economic 
sanctions is that the local and state governments get paid be-
fore others, particularly children due support and victims owed 
restitution. Currently, there are often no clear priorities for the 
collection of legal financial obligations.
337
 Levingston and 
Turetsky suggested that child support and victim restitution 
should take precedence over fines, fees, and surcharges.
338
 It 
would also be useful to have groups that collect legal financial 
obligations share information, so that all of the agencies and 
courts to which the offender owes money are aware of the total 
amounts of money that are owed and the payment schedules 
that have been imposed.
339
  
Also, as mentioned earlier, a single offender is likely to 
have multiple victims, either from the same offense or from 
multiple offenses, including victims whose victimizations were 
not included in the plea agreement.
340
 Guidelines might be help-
ful for handling such cases, or the issue could be handled with a 
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single payment plan across cases.
341
 But at the very least a list 
of all of these victims and the amounts owed to them should be 
made known to the sentencing court. 
VII.  FUTURE ISSUES   
There are two issues that will need to be discussed in the 
future. First, assuming there is variation between counties in 
the imposition of economic sanctions, there may be a need for 
economic sanction guidelines within a state. Second, there is a 
need for further investigations of the extent of, and effects of, 
variation between states. 
A. SHOULD THERE BE STATE-WIDE GUIDELINES? 
A rational system would also be one that understands the 
cost effectiveness of the sanctions and determines that the costs 
are defensible. There are administrative costs for handling eco-
nomic sanctions, and it would be important to know how much 
it costs state courts to process a seven dollar payment for state 
costs, including staff time for recording the amount, computer 
processing time (for those counties with computerized record 
keeping), and monitoring of paper records (for those counties 
without computer records of amounts owed and payments 
made). These costs are especially problematic because many 
economic sanctions involve relatively small amounts of money. 
Our analyses indicated that three-quarters of all economic 
sanctions imposed were for less than fifty dollars.
342
 Whether 
and how much this is a problem depends on the costs involved 
in imposing these sanctions, monitoring offenders to ensure 
that the sanctions are paid, and intervening (e.g., by issuing 
warnings, revoking probation) if they are not paid. Moreover, if 
the amounts are not paid, warnings need to be given and pro-
bation officers need to make judgments about whether proba-
tion should be revoked. For parolees who have not made pay-
ments, decisions must be made about whether parole should be 
revoked for a technical violation (failure to make payments). 
Three changes are needed if we are to increase the likeli-
hood that offenders will pay the economic sanctions imposed on 
them. First, judges need better information about an offender’s 
salary and assets. Now, even with presentence reports, judges 
have little information about how much an offender would be 
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able to pay.
343
 Second, the amounts imposed should be geared 
toward an offender’s salary and net worth, as is true with the 
day fine concept as it is used in Europe. Third, there needs to 
be some system to allow people without funds to pay, either 
through community service for those who are on probation or 
though prison salary for those who are incarcerated in a state 
prison. The usual calculus is that one day in jail is equal to one 
day of fines, which is equal to eight hours of work.
344
 
One option, currently embodied in the recommendations of 
the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing for drug fines, is 
to use community service hours as the starting point for the 
proposed fine.
345
 These recommendations, limited to the lowest 
levels of offense seriousness (Level 1 and Level 2 of the sentenc-
ing guidelines), use community service hours as the starting 
point for the proposed fine, the rationale being that community 
service can be ordered without consideration of the offender’s 
ability to pay.
346
 Although a system of community service would 
allow offenders who are without resources to pay the economic 
sanctions imposed on them, such a system requires that the 
county has the agencies and opportunities for the community 
service and the staff to run the programs (e.g., to supervise 
trash pickup). Such programs require an initial and continuing 
outlay of county resources. 
I have argued that a structure is needed for economic sanc-
tions in order to increase fairness through uniformity, propor-
tionality, certainty, and clarity. Bringing about a structure re-
quires development of the issues outlined in this Article. But 
before concluding, I also want to indicate some of the likely 
problems that will need to be addressed. First, if a guideline 
system is developed for economic sanctions, alone or as a pack-
age with incarceration and other sentencing alternatives, there 
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is the likelihood that, as with current guideline systems, prose-
cutors will still have most of the power and will thus be able to 
avoid the guidelines if they wish.  
Second, if an economic sanction is not imposed, for example 
as part of a plea agreement, there is no one who will be able to 
complain. Victims, particularly of crimes that have been bar-
gained away, may not know of the plea and thus would be un-
likely to complain. If state fines were not imposed, the state 
would need some sort of continuing monitoring system to dis-
cover the omission. By contrast, county costs and fees, if not 
imposed, would be likely to elicit complaints, as the county staff 
needed for monitoring the imposition and payment of these 
sanctions have both the ability and motivation to do so. 
B. NEED FOR RESEARCH 
As indicated earlier in connection with restitution, there is 
variation among the states in the nature of economic sanctions. 
Because of this variation, more work needs to be conducted on 
the actual practice of how economic sanctions are imposed and 
monitored. For example, research conducted in Washington 
state may not be representative of the problem nationally be-
cause of the uniqueness of the law in Washington (e.g., the 
garnishment of a spouse’s wages to pay legal financial obliga-
tions).
347
 At the other extreme, Pennsylvania, the state whose 
economic sanctions I have investigated, may also be different 
from other states. In Pennsylvania, judges in some counties use 
a back-end adjustment to economic sanctions that are unpaid. 
That is, they reduce or waive the economic sanctions if the of-
fender is complying with the conditions of supervision or “is 
making a good-faith effort to repay the debt.”
348
 Moreover, 
Pennsylvania does not charge interest on unpaid economic 
sanctions.
349
 Unlike some other states, Pennsylvania does not 
allow conversion of criminal financial obligations to civil debt.
350
 
And, finally, unlike thirteen of the fifteen states with the larg-
est prison populations, Pennsylvania does not have a public de-
fender fee.
351
 
Policy questions are partly deontological and partly utili-
tarian. That is, there may be some part of a question that is 
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answerable in an absolute sense of right and wrong and some 
part that can be answered only with knowledge of the effec-
tiveness of the policy. Within-state and between-state differ-
ences in economic sanctions raise questions of fairness and 
equal treatment that may be addressable by the law. But ques-
tions about these policies concerning economic sanctions are al-
so in need of better information about how they actually work. 
  CONCLUSION   
In this Article, I have argued that victim restitution should 
be mandatory, fines should be discretionary, and costs and fees 
should be prohibited. Three themes governed this argument 
about the imposition of economic sanctions. First, the law and 
courts should be concerned about victims. They are innocent of 
wrongdoing but face losses that are tangible and intangible, 
and direct and indirect. Moreover, they are especially vulnera-
ble in that they are likely to be victimized again. Because vic-
timization is a predictor of offending, concern about crime vic-
tims might reduce the commission of crime. 
Second, the law and courts should be concerned about of-
fenders. The criminal justice system should help offenders rein-
tegrate into society and should not burden them by imposing 
extra fees or surcharges that directly support the criminal jus-
tice system, imposing fees as restitution, or imposing sanctions 
that are not equally imposed on all (e.g., different costs and fees 
in different counties). Moreover, the use of economic sanctions 
should be structured so as to help offenders learn responsibil-
ity. 
Third, the law and courts should be concerned about the 
community. The use of economic sanctions should be cost effec-
tive. Moreover, their use should reflect concern about future 
victim cooperation and reducing future victimizations. 
Part of what makes a system fair is that (a) it is under-
stood by everyone, both those who administer it and those on 
whom it is imposed and (b) it is transparent, so that third par-
ties (including victims) can easily determine whether it has 
been imposed and enforced. The guidelines need to be under-
standable to four groups: decision makers in the criminal jus-
tice system, offenders, victims, and the general public. The in-
dividuals who make decisions about economic sanctions—
judges, prosecutors, probation officers, and court clerks—need 
to understand them and to be able to explain them to others. 
Offenders need to understand the way economic sanctions work 
for purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence. They need to un-
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derstand that there is a link between their criminal behavior 
and their economic payment. Thus, they need to know how 
much they owe, where the money goes (e.g., the state, the coun-
ty), and for what purposes. Victims also need to understand the 
system, so that they have a better idea about the punishment 
that offenders are undergoing and the likelihood that they will 
receive restitution. Finally, it is important that the system be 
understood by the general public, both to maintain some deter-
rent effect and to engender respect for the law. 
 
